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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A first time visitor to China cannot help but notice the poor. In a country of 1.3 
billion people, the majority of whom still belong to the peasant class, the poor are 
everywhere. As in any other country, they beg on the streets of cities, to which they have 
moved, seeking a better life. They sell trinkets that people buy out of pity: cheap plastic 
bracelets, jasmine blossoms strung together on wire. They push their products on you 
with a kind of desperation. Women sleep on the stairs of the subway stations, small 
children curled up in their laps. In Western countries, many have learned to ignore this 
class, passing by without a second thought. In China, where the total number of peasant 
and migrant people has topped 1 billion, it seems the affluent and the growing middle 
class have learned to do the same. 
What makes these people noticeable to the foreign eye is not only their number, 
but also the quality of their lives. On the Beijing subway, at the busiest time of day, a 
bum victim boards the train. He is selling socks, or is it something else? No one wants 
to look, instead recoiling slightly as he approaches. He is missing an ear, a nose, his eyes 
gaze out of unblinking holes that once were lids; the bums are not quite healed. One 
speculates that this is a work injury. There are still many factories in China where this 
type of injury is possible, from fire or chemicals in unsafe working conditions. If he was 
taken to the emergency room after the accident occurred, he was released before he 
should have been. Perhaps he couldn't pay the fees associated with the specialized 
treatment. 
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He is not the only example of this abandoned class. From a man with cerebral 
palsy begging in his wheelchair as Western expatriates enter the Sanlitun bar street in 
Beijing, to the little boy lying in the dust in Hangzhou, a gaping, fresh wound in the back 
of his leg, people who have not received proper medical care exist in large numbers. 
Health concerns are not, however, their only problem. From housing to rising education 
costs for students past the elementary level, the poor are given little opportunity for 
upward mobility. What little they earn goes either toward food, school or health care, a 
painful choice to make. 
The stories that have come out of China in its era of reform are generally positive. 
They tell of the rapid nature of privatization, the increase in quality of life for a large 
number of citizens, and open-mindedness toward change. Conversely, "comparatively 
fewer accounts on support targeted at her dependent and needy citizens are on offer. And 
yet in a socialist society these are the very persons whose treatment best reflects the 
society's compassion and solidarity."1 For many years, this was not a subject the Chinese 
leaders wanted to address. 
However, the situation of China's poor has not escaped international attention. 
Statistics compiled by the United Nations Development Program indicate that in the 
twenty years following 1978, rural poverty (according to the government's poverty line) 
'Linda Wong, Marginalization and Social Welfare in China, (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1. 
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decreased from 30 percent to 4.6 percent.2 However, a quarter of the rural population had 
less than a minimum level of calorie intake in 1990, and in 1998, a survey in six poor 
counties found over one third had a per capita income below the national poverty line. 
Combined with the high level of under-five mortality, which indicates the deterioration of 
basic public health services, 3 the UNDP decided to set up a framework within China's 
Tenth Five-Year Plan to assist the nation in improving the quality of life in the 
countryside. ABC News recently reported that 75 percent of urban Chinese suffer from 
poor health and that the life expectancy of workers is declining. It was noted: 
Farm families in the countryside can no longer count on 
'barefoot doctors' for basic health services. And although 
city dwellers have access to the country's best medical 
facilities, the lack of a comprehensive health insurance 
system means that many cannot afford medical care.4 
In a nation that still claims socialism as its governing ideology, there are too many 
people for whom the state is not providing. In Maoist China, every work unit and 
collective had a doctor and free health care, however poor. Jobs were guaranteed and the 
peasant was considered the foundation of the state. Now, in the days of rapid 
modernization, those who cannot compete are left behind in the dirty streets. According 
to the principles of socialism, those who need welfare to survive should not be treated 
2 United Nations in China, "Poverty in China," available from 
www.unchina.org/about_chinalhtml/poverty.shtml; Internet, accessed 13 February 2005. The 
government number was at 48 million in 1998. Using the international standard of $1 a day 
results in a greater number of absolute poor. 
3 Ibid. In remote poor areas, the infant mortality rate exceeds 1 in 10, at least twice the national 
average. 
4 American Broadcasting Corporation, ABC7 News, "China Study: City Dwellers in Poor Health," 
20 September 2004. 
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with disdain, and yet the government continues to insist that the family bears the 
responsibility of caring for its members, meanwhile propagating the new social value, "to 
get rich is glorious!"5 It is a socialist country with no social programs, and for the past 
twenty years, the question has remained, is it too expensive to create a safety net for such 
a large population, or does the Communist Party simply not care about the people in 
whose name it was established? 
It is a question many have tried to answer, in the realms of health insurance, 
social welfare, or simply human rights. The central government itself has made many 
superficial changes to the system, and more recently attempted to address all of these 
issues broadly, offering programs to solve every problem. Such solutions are easy to 
devise, but practically very difficult to implement. However, when it comes to the 
situation in Chinese cities, it can be argued that the state is doing an acceptable job of 
phasing in reforms, especially to better the lives of those who were formerly employed in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, the lives of the peasants, the proletariat on 
whose shoulders the Communist Party was borne to power, have been largely ignored 
and left to a decaying social system. Linda Wong accurately sums up the current 
situation: 
In welfare matters, China follows the approach of 'one 
country, separate systems'. Instead of having one system 
that applies equally to every citizen, many different 
systems prevail. These build on varying membership 
5 Although commonly attributed to Deng Xiaoping, and generally in-line with his principles, this 
statement was not his. Many approximates existed in China at the time, and it is the title of a 
1984 book by Orville Schell. 
criteria. They are also distinguished by different range and 
levels of entitlement. 6 
This paper attempts to explore that distinction, focusing on what can be done for 
those people who are left behind in China's current system and attempting to define the 
complexities of the Chinese government that have prevented the state from effectively 
creating a social welfare system for its poor. 
Chapter Two discusses the changes in the system that took place following the 
death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the rise ofDeng Xiaoping in 1978. With the 
dismantling of the communist system, many social programs were dissolved, and for the 
past twenty-five years, the government of China has been making some attempt to deal 
with this problem. That said, however, the main focus of the 1980s was to privatize and 
rapidly increase national wealth. As a consequence of this focus, most social programs 
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were abandoned and ignored. Wealth and power were more important to the Communist 
Party than the welfare of China's citizens. The chapter addresses the reforms that were 
attempted in the early nineties when the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 and 
international attention brought the poor quality of life in China into focus. Because of the 
stark differences in policy written for urban and rural areas, the two will be discussed 
separately in both the first and second chapters, both of which address the issue of social 
welfare from the perspective of what the government has done thus far. 
The third chapter deals with the appearance of the first indications of real change. 
With the publication of a white paper on social security, the government was making an 
attempt to prove its dedication to creating such a system, showing both that it cares about 
6 Wong, 2. 
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international opinion and that it recognizes quality of life to be an important part of social 
stability. In discussing this white paper, it is important to keep in mind that the Chinese 
words "social security" (shehui baozhang) do not refer to a portion of one's income that 
will be paid back upon retirement, but refer more generally to what we would think of as 
social welfare, encompassing health and unemployment insurance, money for the 
disabled, and many other programs. The chapter dissects the promises this white paper 
makes and addresses corresponding reforms that have been recently implemented. As the 
new regulations deal almost exclusively with the urban situation, it is necessary to 
address the question of why the government ought to care about the rural populations, as 
well as what has been done so far in an attempt to improve the lives of those people 
working in the agricultural sector or those in rural areas who are not able to work at all. 
Much of this work has been carried out by outside organizations and non-profits, and this 
chapter includes a brief summary of their initiatives. 
Chapter Four discusses the reasons why the Chinese government's new favorite 
catch phrase in the realm of welfare, "socializing social welfare" (that is, decentralizing 
social programs and encouraging donation and local involvement as a solution to local 
problems), is insufficient. Combined with this concept is that of familism, which also has 
its limits, especially in poorer regions and when taking into account the aging of the 
population. As the first generation born under the one-child policy is entering into 
adulthood, more and more married couples are faced with the prospect of caring 
financially for four parents and their own child. Especially in poor, rural areas, that is 
simply not feasible as a sole means for care. 
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There are many obstacles to effective reform. The funding required to care for 
the population, especially in a country as populous as China, is enormous. In addition, 
there is the problem of corruption. In the Chinese government, this problem often 
cripples government initiatives. For local officials, siphoning off funds is a fairly easy 
endeavor, and because of the increased decentralization, there is little the central 
government can do beyond limited campaigns against corruption. Local officials find 
themselves with no real incentive to distribute the funds in their budgets to the poor. 
China needs officials who are willing to take the initiative to build the system, or villages 
in the countryside will never have the infrastructure necessary to collect funds and 
distribute benefits. 
In the final chapter, some possible solutions to the problem of China's social 
welfare system will be proposed. It will be argued that as long as the central government 
merely allocates funds without supervising their disbursement, there will be no 
improvement in the current situation. The central governing body must take the reform 
measures into its own hands, ensuring that responsibility for implementation is delegated 
to officials who are both capable and honest. A plan must be drawn up for providing care 
to rural townships and villages. Perhaps, in the end, corruption and the sheer scale of the 
project will be insurmountable, but it seems much more likely that the Chinese 
government will be able to provide for its citizens everywhere, once it begins to take an 
interest in their livelihoods. 
CHAPTER2 
THE BEGINNINGS OF REFORM 
It would be impossible to understand where China is today in terms of social 
welfare without understanding the history of the situation since the outset of Communist 
control. In isolation, current measures being implemented seem appropriate for a country 
just beginning to deal with the problem of providing for its citizens. However, one must 
keep in mind that the impoverished in China have gone through many changes since the 
Communists came into power in 1949. They have been ignored, become the focus of the 
proletarian revolution, and fallen back into impoverished anonymity. This chapter 
broadly addresses the system put in place during the Maoist era, as well as the collapse of 
that system at the beginning of China's reform period in 1978. It discusses various 
programs that have been implemented since then in an attempt to deal with the problem 
of China's poor. In any discussion of China, a distinction must be made between the 
urban and rural areas (i.e. all unemployment statistics deal with urban areas because there 
is no measure for rural unemployment.). In this chapter, the two are discussed separately 
because their situations developed quite differently. From the measures that have been 
implemented during the reform period, it will become clear that the central government 
has much work ahead of it if it intends to improve the quality of life of its people. 
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Social Welfare in Mao's China 
The collective, rather than the central government, provided social services to 
rural people during the Maoist era. The commune was responsible for providing 
education, health and social services, and where one worked often heavily influenced the 
type and quality of care. Broadest welfare was determined by rural or urban status and 
employment. Beyond basic provisions, however, very few people qualified for extra 
assistance: 
As far as civil affairs services were concerned, only persons 
who do not have family, for example childless elders and 
orphans, and have no work or income, qualify. Finally, 
personal situations like disability, infirmity, poverty or 
individual problems [were] pertinent. Special services 
cater[ ed] to different needs and problems. 1 
This aid was usually subject to the discretion of local officials and the masses. For 
people who did not fall into these limited categories, primary aid was received through 
the family. 
Familism 
Chinese leaders are strong adherents to the ethic of family responsibility in health 
care and welfare.2 The family was, and remains today, the most important component of 
1 Wong, 3. 
2 John Dixon, The Chinese Welfare System: 1949-1979, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981). 
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an individual's well being in times of difficulty. The basic idea of familism is an ancient 
Chinese principle stemming from Confucianism. It comprises filial piety (xiao), 
requiring the young of the family to take care of its elders, while the elders in turn ensure 
the well being of their children, from arranging marriages to allocating shares of income. 3 
Because families were reasonably self-sufficient, there was no need for community-wide 
welfare initiatives. The basic ideology of the family as a production unit was echoed and 
upheld in the area of welfare by the Communist Party when it came into power in 1949. 
This principle is a partial explanation for the lack of poverty alleviation and security 
programs beyond basic commune provisions. Because "people's needs were first met 
within families and then within the collective,'>4 there was no need for the state to support 
you unless you lacked a family. Given other policies of the Communist Party that acted 
to break up the family, sending children off to be reeducated during the Cultural 
Revolution, for example, it is likely that rather than adhering to Confucian philosophy, 
the Party found familism a convenient way to shift responsibility away from the 
government and focus on projects it found to be more important, such as growth. 
Medical Care 
Although the central government funded health care in urban areas, it left care for 
the majority of its people to local governments and collectives. This was not an easy task 
given the large numbers of communes and small numbers of professionally trained 
3 Joe C.B. Leung and Richard Nann, Authority and Benevolence: Social Welfare in China, (Hong 
Kong: The Chinese U P, 1995), 2. 
4 Wong, 166. 
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physicians. The solution to this difficulty was the class of "barefoot doctors" that arose 
during the Cultural Revolution, peasants with rudimentary sanitation and medical training 
who performed duties in the clinics in addition to their farming responsibilities. In the 
1970s, rural cooperative medical services (RCMS) were developed, with each peasant 
who wished to participate paying a membership fee of .35 to 3.6 yuan per person.5 The 
cost of medical care depended on whether or not patients were referred to city hospitals 
and whether they chose to receive traditional herbal medicine or a Western medication. 
It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of this method, as during the Cultural Revolution, 
aggregation of data beyond the local unit was discouraged. However, as commune 
residents, the people of the countryside had housing, access to education and the 
reasonable assumption that they could receive basic medical care when needed, and 
"during the peak period of the RCMS's tenure (1970s), 90 percent of the rural 
populations were covered under this prepayment scheme." 6 However, in the early 1980s, 
the agricultural reforms resulted in the collapse of the system in most rural areas.7 
Unemployment 
Even before Communist control, the largest problem in the cities was 
unemployment. Prior to 1962, migration from the countryside to urban areas was 
allowed, and occurred in large numbers. From 1949 to 1957, the urban population rose at 
5 Ruth Sidel and Victor W. Side!, The Health of China, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1982), 46. This 
number was usually 1-3% of a family's income. They then paid from five to tenfen per visit. 
6 Yuanli Liu and William C. Hsiao, China's Poor and Poor Policies: The Case of Rural Health 
Insurance, paper presented at the Conference on Financial Sector Reform in China, Harvard 
School of Public Health, Cambridge, Ma., 11-13 September 2001, 5. 
7 Sidel and Sidel, 5. 
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a rate of seven percent per year. The government faced the problem of "creating 
sufficient urban employment to match the rising urban population."8 Poverty due to 
unemployment was never completely alleviated in Communist China, in spite of Liu 
Shaoqi's plea that businesses and employed persons contribute to a public fund to support 
these people. In the 1950s, this support was a last resort; the best alternative was to give 
them jobs, "including temporary work on municipal projects, military training, rural 
work, or work in cooperative workshops."9 Retraining programs were also available. 
"Homes for Loafers" offered retraining for city vagrants, but these people often remained 
after their reformation process was over, due to lack of jobs for them to take. For most of 
the 60s and 70s, however, no aid was given at all by the government for the simple 
reason that officially, China had no unemployment. 10 However, local governments were 
still permitted to give money to neighborhoods with large numbers of unemployed, and 
families had access to limited needs-based support. 
Even while claiming there was no unemployment, the central government's 
solution to the problem, at least in part, was the rustification campaign of the Cultural 
Revolution, during which unemployed graduates were sent to the countryside by the 
thousands, thereby reallocating the government's human resources and temporarily 
reducing much of the population strain. With the youth being reeducated in the 
countryside, the number of people seeking to enter the job-world decreased significantly. 
8 Ibid., 103. 
9 Dixon, 339. 
10 Ibid., 340. "The problem of unemployment was completely solved in the new China in 1958." 
(New China News Agency, April1976) 
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The approximately seven million youths remaining in the cities could be assigned to jobs, 
as they had been for decades in the Communist system. 
Post-Mao China 
To the greatest extent possible, China's leaders in the reform period moved away 
from the system as it was under Mao. The reforms that were instituted changed almost 
every citizen's life and, for the most part, changed it for the better. However, there are 
some who find themselves thinking back with nostalgia for their pre-reform lives, 
wishing for the days when at least some care was guaranteed. 
Reforms Shift Focus Away from Social Welfare 
It is perhaps because of the focus on decentralization of social services during the 
Cultural Revolution that has made it so difficult for the government to take over the 
responsibility since the breakup of the commune system. The collectives housed and 
cared for a huge number of people, and the government lacked the infrastructure to 
extend services to all of the former collectives. However, it is most likely that the state 
has not assumed this responsibility because its priorities lie in modernization and growth, 
not in the welfare of its people overall. In order to modernize medical services, for 
example, the central government could provide help only to a very small percentage of 
the people. Because the new training was specialized and expensive, fewer people could 
become doctors: 
In short, training in the health professions shows many of 
the changes seen in the rest of China's education system 
and suggests - over the two years at the end of the decade -
a rapid shift ... toward a much more technically trained, 
professionalized system. 11 
Even those semi-professional health workers, the barefoot doctors, left the medical 
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profession en masse because agricultural reform had improved the income derived from 
farming. 12 A relatively small number of health care providers remained. Following Deng 
Xiaoping's vision of a successful few pulling the masses up with them, the focus of post-
Mao development left a majority of China's citizens without care. 
This is not to say that nothing changed regarding the quality of services offered to 
urban residents in China during the years of privatization. Large new hospitals were 
constructed that specialized in the treatment of specific, dangerous diseases. In large 
cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, services developed as rapidly as the rest 
of the economy, offering Western medicine and methods as well as traditional Chinese 
medicine. 13 However, the problem remains today in the small cities and rural areas, 
where the "modem facilities" of which the government boasts consist of a relatively 
clean room where a doctor can examine a patient with a sanitized thermometer and a 
11 Ibid., 70. 
12 Yuanli Liu, et al., "Transformation of China's Rural Health Care Financing," Social Science 
and Medicine 41, no. 8 (1995): 1087. 
13 
"Health and Medical Care," China Through a Lens, available from 
http://china.org.cn/english/features/China2004/107020; Internet. 
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stethoscope. In rural areas, it can only be stated that a medical network has "taken 
shape."14 
The Rural Situation 
Rural communities in China were largely left alone during the Maoist era, as the 
communes were intended to be self-sufficient, providing for every family. After 
agricultural reform, the central government assumed that rural areas could adjust 
themselves without aid as easily as they always had. However, the government could not 
have been more incorrect. With the collapse of the rural medical system and lack of 
communal funds, poverty soon became an incredible burden. 
Approximately 70 percent of Chinese people live in rural areas, and the vast 
majority of these are farmers, trying to work a small portion of land. 15 Their techniques 
are outmoded and inefficient, because they lack the necessary equipment for modem 
farming. The government downplayed this problem well into the 1990s. In 1995, the 
official estimate of the poverty rate in rural China was six percent, 16 yet even when using 
the official poverty line this rate cannot be supported (see table 1). 
14 Sidel and Sidel, 104. 
15 CIA World Factbook, China, 27 January 2005; available from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html; Internet; accessed 29 January 2005. 
China has only 15.4% arable land, and approximately 50% of the labor force is engaged in 
agricultural production. 
16 Carl Riskin and Li Shi, "Chinese Rural Poverty Inside and Outside the Poor Regions," in 
China's Retreat From Equality: Income Distribution and Economic Transition, ed. Carl Riskin, 
et al. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 335. 
Table 1. Incidences and Rates of Poverty Inside and Outside the Poor Regions, for Alternative 
Poverty Thresholds, 1995 
PoQrR~giQn NQn£1QOr RegiQn Total 
Official poverty line: 530 yuan 
Number of poor 1,324 2,909 4,233 
Percent of poor population 31.3 68.7 100.0 
16 
Poverty incidence(%) 15.78 10.12 11.40 
Adjusted poverty line: 570 yuan 
Number of poor 1,609 3,264 4,873 
Percent of poor population 33.0 67.0 100.0 
Poverty incidence (%) 19.17 11.36 13.12 
Riskin poverty line: 662 yuan 
Number of poor 2,269 2,320 4,589 
Percent of poor population 49.4 50.6 100.0 
Poverty incidence (%) 27.04 8.07 12.36 
Notes: The adjusted poverty line is derived by inflating the official poverty line for 1988, 260 
yuan, using the national consumer price index for 1988-1995. Household incomes are adjusted to 
reflect each province's price behavior relative to the national CPl. The Riskin poverty line is 
based upon Riskin's poverty threshold of 301 yuan in 1988 (excluding rental value of housing), 
which is inflated using the provincial price indexes for 1988-1995. The sample is weighted by 
actual population in the poor counties and nonpoor counties. The total number of observations is 
37,134 in the 1995 rural household survey. SSB's definition of net income is used together with 
SSB poverty lines, that is, 530 yuan and 570 yuan, as the official poverty line. Household 
disposable income per capita (excluding rental value of housing) is used in connection with the 
Riskin poverty line. 
Source: Carl Riskin and Li Shi, "Chinese Rural Poverty Inside and Outside the Poor Regions," in 
China's Retreat From Equality: Income Distribution and Economic Transition ed. Carl Riskin, et 
al. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 336. 
Note: This chart deals exclusively with £10or and noni>Qm rural regions. 
The 8-7 Plan 
Some action has been taken to reduce the widening poverty gap between the 
rapidly growing coastal areas and the poor interior regions. In 1994, China's central 
government launched the 8-7 Plan, a "far-reaching poverty reduction strategy"17 dealing 
with 592 poverty counties. According to China's own estimates, the plan, the objective 
17 Liu and Hsiao, 3. 
17 
of which was to raise the per capita incomes of approximately 80 million poor to 500 
yuan within seven years, was widely successful. The World Bank, however, evaluates 
the program to have had insignificant effect on the number of poor, in spite of 
improvements in the social and economic structure of these rural areas. 18 The problem in 
this case, is one of scope. An increasing number of China's poor live in the western 
areas, where population is less effectively controlled and natural resources are scarce. 19 
This plan, though it attempted to deal with the western regions, could not sufficiently 
affect these difficult-to-access counties for the better. 
Urban Situation 
In the cities, where the danwei (work unit) system brought workers health 
insurance and job security, the dismantling of the socialist system affected people 
differently, but no less seriously. For the most part, the danwei remained relatively stable; 
those with jobs continued to receive support, and in urban areas, many reforms even 
strengthened the danwei system. The problem in the cities was one of jobs. With six 
million students graduating from middle school in 1980, and only 285,000 continuing 
onto college, this meant a large number of jobs were needed. In previous years, students 
18 The World Bank, "China's 8-7 National Poverty Reduction Program," Reducing Poverty, 
Sustaining Growth Shanghai Conference, available from 
http://www. worldbank.org/wbilreducingpoverty /case-China-8-7PovertyReduction.html; Internet; 
accessed 1 February 2005. 
19 China Population Information Net, "Population, Top Challenge in China's Western 
Development," available from http://www.cpirc.org.cn; Internet; accessed 29 January 2005. "The 
10 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in the west have a population of 283 
million, making up 22.7 percent of the country's total, while the arable land in the west accounts 
for 23.7 percent of the national total." The population of the region grew at an annual average of 
2.6 percent between 1990 and 1998. 
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had grown accustomed to the government finding guaranteed jobs for them. In May of 
that year, there were over 25,000 unemployed young people in the northern city of 
Harbin alone.20 The new leadership had a choice. It could resolve the problem according 
to the principles of socialism, or it could continue to put forth the new ideas of market 
reform it had been championing. It chose development over care for the people. Urban 
workers, especially women, were encouraged to retire at fifty, making room for the 
young, but little was offered as support for those who were forced to leave their jobs or 
for those who were unable to find employment. 
Employment Structure Reforms 
After 1978, Deng Xiaoping's Party did not use mass displacement as a means to 
control unemployment. However, reforms of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the 
introduction of labor markets made layoffs possible for the first time in the early 1980s, 
significantly affecting urban workers. 21 Specifically, four regulations were introduced in 
October 1986 that had serious implications for employed Chinese citizens. These 
"Temporary Regulations" abolished life tenure for new recruits into state enterprises, 
dismantled the system by which a child would be substituted for its retiring parent, 
thereby making possible recruitment and competition for posts, gave firms the right to 
fire employees who repeatedly performed poorly, and legalized unemployment insurance, 
previously an abomination to the socialist state.22 
20 Sidel and Sidel, 110-11. 
21 Joe C.B. Leung, "Social Security Reforms in China: Issues and Prospects," International 
Journal of Social Welfare 12 (2003): 81. 
22 Wong, 66. 
19 
The "Waiting For Employment" Scheme 
Unlike in its relatively loose relationship with rural areas, the central government 
had always supported the urban population, nearly all of whom were employed in SOEs 
during the Maoist Era. This historical factor helps to explain why reforms have held a 
decidedly urban slant over the past two decades. Not only had a social contract been 
established with the urban workers, but also urban unrest posed much more of a threat to 
the government, which preferred to focus solely on growth, rather than instability. 
Having guaranteed employment for so many years, in the 1980s the government 
was faced with the dilemma of finding employment for people entering into the 
workforce while at the same time increasing competition. The "Waiting for 
Employment" scheme was set up in 1986 to deal with the problem of unemployment. Its 
scope was somewhat limited, however, catering "only to those employees in SOEs 
declaring bankruptcy, with their employment contracts terminated and being dismissed 
by their SOE employer.'m The schemes offered a basic living allowance, which fell 
around the local poverty line, for a period of two years. It was also under-utilized. In 
1995, although seven million unemployed qualified for the benefits, only two million 
actually received the money.24 
In 1999, the scheme (renamed Regulations on Unemployment Insurance) was 
expanded to cover all types of employees and economic sectors. However, even if one 
factors in the percentage of the funds that went to re-employment service centers and 
courses (57 percent), rather than to the unemployed, the scheme was inadequate. Only 
23 Leung, 81. 
24 Wong, 199. 
20 
1.1 million of the 5.8 million registered employed were covered. 25 Clearly the 
government has much progress to make in the realm of unemployment provisions. 
The Dislocated 
One of the main reasons that the urban Chinese welfare system remained so poor 
was the hukou, or household registration, system. Implemented to prevent mass rural-
urban migration, this system prevented migrants to the cities from receiving health care 
and housing. It did not, however, prevent them from moving to the cities in search of 
better jobs and the potential for a better life. In the first half of the 1990s, migrant 
workers, people who lacked an urban hukou, could not receive any of the rights of 
citizens, because they were not legal residents. In 1992, it was estimated that over 70 
million Chinese made up this "floating" population.26 They were ineligible for any 
housing, education, or medical welfare or services, unless they could make the necessary 
payments.27 They were not even permitted to rent and sleep in the floor space on which 
they worked, though many businesses ignored this law. Because of these laws, 
shantytowns, such as Zhejiang Village in Beijing, grew up around the cities, in the worst 
areas sometimes holding more than 500 people in 300 run-down shacks. If they could 
not afford to rent, and the government would not provide, the answer was often to create 
their own system: 
25 Leung, 81. 
They holed up in hidden back streets, in tunnels, under 
trucks and buses in parking lots, in the waiting areas of 
26 Leung and Nann, 48. 
27 Dorothy J. Solinger, "China's Floating Population," in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao 
Reforms ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999), 233. 
railway stations, and under bridges ... when sheltered at all, 
this marginal, undomiciled group made do with the crudest 
of adaptations of scrap metal, cardboard and wood. But 
one way or another, alternatives to the state's designs had 
been devised.28 
Because all of the funding for services was pegged to the official populace, the 
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government turned its head when local schools refused to take in migrant students in spite 
of the law stipulating children 7-15 must receive education for nine years.29 However, 
from creating their own illegal schools for their children to building makeshift clinics for 
migrant doctors to use, the floating population found a way to survive, however poorly, 
without government approval. 
Conclusion 
Post-Mao China continued in this vein of ineffective and reluctant reforms for 
many years. As long as the economy was developing, the government could claim to be 
fulfilling its purpose in working toward the benefit of China. The lives of individuals 
were subordinated to massive growth and an increased stature in the world. 
In the early years of reform, the rural-urban gap was actually diminishing. 
However, government policies threatened to return the country to pre-1949 conditions, 
allowing a few to get rich off the backs of the poor. It is seen as a necessary evil, but the 
28 Ibid., 234. Quote by Cheng Li. 
29 Ibid., 236. In 1995, only 40 percent of migrant children were enrolled in official schools. 
Villages were prohibited from establishing their own schools until 1997. 
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fact remains that it is an evil. Prior to Gaige kaifang,30 though the government essentially 
neglected rural poverty, policies to reduce urban inequalities, focusing mainly on labor 
insurance, had a significant impact.31 This guaranteed support for those who were too 
old, too young or too ill to work. However, when Deng Xiaoping privatized the system, 
state owned enterprises began rapidly withdrawing from the program, unable to provide 
their workers with the money needed to survive. In the new capitalist system, companies 
were also forced to shed workers to maintain costs. Many workers' clinics, day cares and 
reduced-cost accommodations were eliminated.32 This, along with other policies, insured 
that the poor would remain underserved for over two decades. 
30 Deng Xiaoping's privatization system, "reform and opening up," begun in 1979. 
31 Apo Leong, and Stephen Frost, "From Security to Uncertainty- Labour and Welfare Reform in 
China," Asian Labour Update (June-August 2000). 
32 Ibid, 2000. 
CHAPTER3 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S SOLUTION 
In the late 1990s, with loosened restrictions on the hukou ("household 
registration") system and China well on its way to being a global power, some of China's 
social problems should have been resolved. However, the World Bank estimated that 
between 1990 and 1995, there was a "modest deepening" of poverty as the number of 
poor people rose in spite of attempts at reform. "Hence, the job of fighting poverty would 
become harder still as the remainder would be the hard-core poor and those least 
responsive to policy intervention." 1 Though employed urban residents now have access 
to basic health care, the poor and unemployed are still unable to afford these services. 
For laid-off workers, the price is especially high. No longer receiving the health and 
housing benefits offered by their former employer, many receive barely a third of their 
former salary in social welfare. After necessities, there is not much left over for 
insurance payments: "I maintain a very strict budget of five yuan for our daily meals. We 
use our wages first to buy staple food. It doesn't matter whether there is meat or not. If I 
borrow this month, then next month I will have to be even more stringent."2 
One Hangzhou woman, laid off in 1998 when her factory was sold for real-estate 
development, receives 240 yuan per month in unemployment benefits. Her story is like 
that of many other workers, laid off as their jobs become redundant in the rapidly 
growing economic system. Having no secure job, she spends 600 yuan per term for her 
1 Wong, 109. 
2 Laid off worker in Beijing. Leong and Frost, 2000. 
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child's schooling and books, and 1,120 yuan per year for her child's insurance. This 
leaves the family entirely dependent on her husband's small salary for food, clothing and 
shelter, as well as medical expenses for the two adults. 3 
The Chinese government has recently acknowledged that their system is 
inadequate, which is, in actuality, a huge step forward, and has been implementing many 
new programs and laws that claim to resolve the problem of China's poor. This chapter 
addresses recent government action on social security, as well as the central 
government's perception of its own success. In addition to government policy, several 
outside organizations, notably the World Bank, have taken an interest in improving the 
situation of China's poor. This attention led to a focus on welfare and health care that has 
not been previously seen in China, and may have important affects on the transformation 
of its social system. 
The Central Government's Response 
The Central Government's attitude has been in many ways one of satisfaction 
with its current role in social welfare. According to former head of the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Security, Zhang Zuoji: 
Since 1998, the Central Committee of the Party, with 
Comrade Jiang Zemin serving as its core leadership, has 
taken the high ground of stabilizing the entire country 
through reform and development, and from that vantage 
point has taken social security to be a key pillar of the 
3 Zhang Hang, interview by the author, Hangzhou, China, informal, 26 November 2004. 
socialist market economy, a fundamental guarantee for the 
lasting peace and security of the state and social order.4 
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This is true in that some key measures have been put in place to deal with the problem of 
China's poor. One of Jiang Zemin's principles was to emphasize "The Two Ensures" 
(liang ge quebao ), referring to the fact that the government should ensure the basic 
livelihoods of workers in state-owned enterprises who have been laid off as well as 
guarantee that retirement funds and annuities of workers who have retired from SOEs be 
paid in full and on time. 5 
Because of this focus, government treasuries were instructed to adjust their 
budgets to make increased room for social security. It was stipulated that during the 
"Tenth Five-Year Plan," government spending on social security would be 15 to 20 
percent of total expenditures. It was the Ministry of Labor and Social Security's 
responsibility to expand the scope of levying and collecting social insurance funds and to 
work to create a mechanism for effective disbursement of retirement funds and pensions 
that was even-handed and followed the principle of "socializing social welfare" (shehui 
.fuli shehuihua). However, responsibility for most of the funding still rested with the local 
governments, who were expected to modify their functions and to devote a large majority 
of any excess fiscal capacity to supplementing social security funds. The central 
government did not volunteer any new funding, but claimed for its part to monetarily 
support local governments in regions and localities where there was difficulty in 
4 Zhang Zuoji, "Guanyu shehui baozhang tixi jianshe wenti" (On the question of the construction 
of a social security system), Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao baogao xuan (Selections from 
reports of the central party school of the Chinese Communist Party) I 0 (200 l ). 
5 Ibid. 
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generating funds for social security payments "even though they have tried their best to 
do their work in this area of governance properly."6 
As evidenced by claims of The Two Ensures' success, those in the upper levels of 
the government were clearly very proud of this advancement: "This period of time-
since the late 1990s - has been a period of the most rapid growth and development of the 
construction of the social security system in China since the founding of the People's 
Republic."7 However this was still the same country with a law on the books stipulating 
that children were required to care for their parents, even to the point that the elderly 
parents could sue if they did not receive funding.8 The government was still distancing 
itself from problems that should be "familial." Because many children still do not have 
the means to care for their parents or are unwilling to do so, it is clear that the 
government was still leaving too much to the family. 
Although Jiang Zemin's government committed itself to resolving the issue of 
social welfare and laying the foundations for improvements, there was still much to be 
done, and the problem has remained the focus of international attention. For this reason, 
the central government under Hu Jintao was also faced with the necessity of improving 
policies and implementing changes. It most recently addressed the issue through its 
typical medium: a baipishu ("white paper"). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Tim Johnson, "Rare Law Compels Chinese to Provide Care for Their Aging Parents," Houston 
Chronicle, 10 February 2005. The law is entitled "Protecting the Rights and Interests of the 
Elderly" 
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China's Social Security White Paper 
In September of 2004, the Information Office of the State Council released a new 
government white paper, entitled "China's Social Security and Its Policy," which 
addressed social welfare for children, the disabled and the unemployed. It is sweeping in 
its coverage and generous in its financial allocations; in fact, the paper declares that in 
2003, nearly 87 billion yuan was budgeted for social services from the central 
government alone, adding billions more from local govemments.9 The reportage in 
national newspapers echoes the confident tones of the white paper, explaining that the 
central government has put in place programs to care for all who need protection, and that 
it "actively promotes to development of social welfare, raising funds through various 
channels to provide social welfare benefits for the elderly, orphans and the disabled." 10 
Today, according to the white paper, there are 38,000 social welfare organizations 
of various kinds for elderly people. The state initiated the "Starlight Plan - national 
Community Welfare Service for elderly People" in 2001, and by June 2004, 32,000 
Starlight Homes had been built (or reconstructed) in urban and rural areas all over China, 
with a total investment of 13.49 billion yuan. The white paper also claims that the central 
government provides comprehensive welfare for children, including immunization and 
education, and provides welfare projects and facilities for children with special 
9 Government White Papers, "China's Social Security and Its Policy," issued 7 September 2004. 
Given current exchange rate, this amounts to over 10 billion US dollars. For a breakdown of the 
financial allocations, see Appendix A. 
10 People's Daily (China), "China Establishes Social Welfare System with Various Channels," 7 
September 2004. 
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difficulties, such as orphans and abandoned children and children with disabilities, taking 
special care to ensure their livelihood, recovery and education. 11 
The document deals extensively with the unemployed and people who have lost 
their jobs due to injury in the workplace. According to the paper, in 1999 the Chinese 
government issued the "Regulations on Unemployment Insurance," which "effectively 
standardized and improved the unemployment insurance system."12 According to these 
regulations, all enterprises and institutions in urban areas as well as their employees are 
required to participate in the program. 
The language of this white paper, for all it promises, remains frustratingly vague. 
For example: 
Governments at all levels include services for elderly 
people in their social-economic development plans, 
gradually increase investments in services for elderly 
people, and encourage investment from all sectors of 
society. 13 
Though it claims participation in many of the programs is mandatory, it does not 
offer any incentive mechanism or guidelines that local governments should follow to 
invest funds. Nowhere in the white paper is any explanation offered of where the funding 
for the various social problems will be found. Only one thing remains clear: solving the 
problems of the rural citizens of China is not part of the equation. 
II Ibid. 
12 People's Daily (China), "Over 100 Million Chinese Join in Unemployment Insurance in 2003," 
September 7, 2004. 
13 
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A Decidedly Urban Focus 
Only the last two sections of"China's Social Security and Its Policy" refer to the 
rural areas, and these sections cover few programs, focusing mainly on the continued 
support of the family. Provisions outlined for old-age insurance, the standardization of 
unemployment insurance, workman's compensation and maternity insurance apply to 
only citizens living in China's urban areas. 
In spite of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security's (MOLSS) hard work and 
claims of success, they mean little to the country at large, because the Ministry does not 
deal with rural areas. Care for rural poor is delegated to the relatively weak and 
financially strapped Ministry of Civil Affairs. The central government may brag about 
the effectiveness of its programs, but it is only bragging about changing the lives of 30 
percent of the total population. 
lJnemploymentinsurance 
Approximately eight million Chinese enter the workforce per year, and the state 
postulates that in the next twenty years, the working-age population will grow on average 
by 5.5 million people annually, reaching 940 million in 2020.14 New workers are not 
displacing older, still-capable workers. As China's population ages, the number of 
China's unemployed continues to rise. Maintaining state-owned enterprises is becoming 
an encumbrance, and many of them are cutting back on workers or shutting down 
entirely. In 1995, it was estimated that up to 20 percent of the workers in SOEs were 
14 China Through a Lens, "China Publishes a White Paper on Employment," available from 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Apr/93983.htm; Internet, 26 April2004. 
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redundant, 15 and these enterprises can no longer afford to bear that financial burden. 
Because unemployment was ignored for so long, and because the changes in the economy 
tend to mean the government cannot provide jobs for everyone, much is needed in the 
area of unemployment insurance. 
The most recent project is to replace the existing unemployment insurance system 
with one that is controlled less by the enterprise than the state. Previously, the 
unemployed enrolled in centers where they could apply to receive funding from their 
former employer. These enterprise controlled unemployment systems usually resulted in 
the laid-off workers not being paid. Under the new system, "the enterprises will, 
according to the provisions of the law, legally dissolve their relations with such workers 
and these workers will then be absorbed into the new unemployment insurance system."16 
To meet the standards of participation in the program, a person must have paid 
unemployment insurance premiums for at least a year, have registered as unemployed 
and willing to work, and not have left their job voluntarily. The amount of funding 
allocated and how the process of disbursement should be carried out is left to the local 
governments, but the government white paper stipulates the length of time a person is 
eligible for payments based on the number of years he or she has paid premiums. If the 
unemployed person has paid the premiums for more than 10 years, he or she is eligible 
for 24 months ofbenefits.17 
15 Leung and Nann, 147. 
16 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
17 
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For those who have been laid off from a SOE, the government will provide for 
"three guarantees": a basic livelihood guarantee, minimum living standard guarantee and 
unemployment insurance guarantee. These people receive a living allowance for up to 
three years, and if at the end of that time they have still not been reemployed, they can 
then receive unemployment insurance payments. Prior to reform, the state guaranteed 
these people livelihoods, and they continue to fulfill that social contract. 
The state considers the project of unemployment insurance an overwhelming 
success. A great deal of funding has gone into the "Two Ensures" program. "In 1998, it 
was slightly higher than 9 billion rmb; by 1999 it had grown to 25 billion rmb, and by 
2000 it had further increased to 47 billion rmb." 18 Zhang Zuoji also claims that there will 
not be any new cases in which payments of retirement or pension funds or of basic living 
costs subsidies to workers who have been laid off are not made punctually or in full. 
Pension Reform 
Because of the growing number of retirees, funds for pension plans proposed and 
implemented in the 1980s were not sufficient to cover the future liabilities. In the 1990s 
it was suggested that the government expand the scheme to cover employees in all 
economic sectors and to require employee contribution, as well as to allow for optional 
contributions by companies to give supplementary benefits. 
As a result, the overall range of coverage of "retirement insurance" expanded 
gradually each year, until, according to the state, "by the end of the year 2000, more than 
18 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
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10 [million] people (workers) throughout the country took part in this insurance policy." 19 
In addition, individual contributions have increased. In 1997, an equivalent to 11 percent 
of the employee's monthly wages would be allocated to individual accounts. Every two 
years, "individual contributions would increase by 1% of the individual's wage ... from 
4% up to a maximum of 8%. Meanwhile, the work unit's contribution to the individual 
accounts would decrease gradually to 3%."20 Under this plan, workers with less than 15 
years of experience would not be eligible for a pension, but would receive a lump sum 
amount from individual accounts. Upon the retiree's death, his or her relatives could 
inherit a portion of the account. 
One of the most serious problems set before the central government was that of 
prompt payment of pensions. There was previously no law to enforce enterprises to 
contribute. In 1998, for instance, the official rate at which retirement funds and pensions 
were paid out properly and "in a socialized fashion" was only 34%.21 Then, in 1999, the 
State Council issued the Temporary Regulations on Collecting Social Insurance 
Contributions, in order to improve collection. The Regulations made the failure to make 
contributions an offence, as well as stipulated that 80 percent of the contribution had to 
be made in government bonds, as the stock market was too volatile.22 In addition, the 
State Council set up a National Social Security Foundation in 2000. Funded by the 
19 Ibid. 
20 Leung, 79. 
21 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. According to the state, in 1999 this figure rose to 48%, and in 2000 it 
jumped to 81%. Also, Zhang claims that by the end of the first quarter of 2001, the number had 
already reached "a remarkable 94%." 
22 Leung, 80. 
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central government, the Foundation was established to assist local authorities that were 
meeting difficulties in making prompt payments to the laid-off and retired. 23 
This progress is admirable, but the central government is prepared to take away 
the benefits it has given. In 2001, the government decided that the size of individual 
retirement accounts would be reduced, from 11 percent of the worker's wages to eight 
percent. This proposal also indicated that retirement accounts from that point on would 
be made up entirely of individual contributions.24 Because of this change, it has been 
estimated that future retirees will receive only 60 percent of their working wages, rather 
than the 80 percent they received previously.25 
Enterprises that were under a collective system of ownership and did not 
participate in the pension insurance system do not fall under this system. According to 
the MOLSS, their retired employees will be paid a monthly cost of living stipend by the 
local government. The central government also stated in the white paper that in order to 
ensure the payment of all pensions, the state (at all levels) would increase the subsidy for 
old-age insurance in its budget. In 2003, the paper said, it contributed 54.4 billion yuan 
to these funds, 47.4 billion of which came from the central budget.26 
23 Ibid., 81. 
24 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
25 Leung, 79. 
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Life Outside the Cities 
If the stories in wealthy urban areas are sad, they get much worse in rural areas or 
poorer cities. In 2000, China's Gini coefficient was 0.46,27 and the regional disparities 
have remained great. Where rich provinces are able to provide some hospitals and care 
for the poor, other provinces lag behind.28 Today, 70 percent of China's population 
(approximately 910 million people) lives in rural areas and has no medical insurance. In 
spite of programs implemented by the government and various international 
organizations, little progress has been made to help these people. 
Why the government should care 
For the Chinese government, stability and economic prosperity have always been 
paramount, closely followed by attention to international opinion. It seems contradictory 
then, that it should do almost nothing to improve the lives of the majority of its 
population. If approximately 70 percent of Chinese citizens are living in rural areas 
without care, it follows that economic efficiency and contentment of the populace are not 
being maximized. In order to prevent growing discontent with the Communist as ruling 
party and increased criticism from abroad, the central government must work to 
implement effective policies for the rural poor. 
27 Leong and Frost, 2000. The Gini Coefficient is a measure of income inequality ranging from 0 
to 1, 1 being perfect inequality, 0 meaning perfect equality. 
28 The World Bank Group, "China- Health Nine Project," project introduction, 20 February 
1998. 
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Health 
It appears that rural poverty owes itself for the most part to a lack of rural health 
care. The Chinese press acknowledges the fact that 20 to 30 percent of China's poor 
"owe their poverty to health problems. The percentage is as high as 60 percent in some 
areas."29 This statistic suggests that health insurance should be a major focus for the 
Chinese government, as these people have no coverage. Those who cannot afford to see 
doctors because of the high medical charges are less effective in the national economy. 
In poor rural areas bed-ridden days and lost workdays are twice as high as the national 
rural average. In 1996, a survey found that approximately 18 percent of rural households 
that used available health services incurred expenses that exceeded their total household 
income. 30 It is no wonder, then, that in spite of increased quality of hospitals and 
personnel, rural China suffers from a decrease in those who take advantage of the 
services. Households with large debts - those that have to sell their assets to pay for care 
and sometimes go without food as a result- rarely invest in agricultural production. As 
their subsequent living standards decline, the health of household members also declines, 
creating a vicious cycle of poverty and illness. The people are generally willing to work, 
but they need financial assistance to regain their ability to serve as healthy, active 
members of the workforce.31 
29 China Through a Lens, "Free Medical Care for the Poor," available from 
http://www.china.org.cn; Internet. 30 May, 2002. 
30 Yuanli Liu and Hu S, et al., "Is Community Financing Necessary and Feasible for Rural 
china?" Health Policy 38, no. 3 (1996). 
31 Liu and Hsiao, 9. 
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Welfare Access 
Bearing in mind the size of need, peasants' access to welfare is extremely limited. 
In 1998, official sources claimed about 80 percent, sometimes 75 percent, of China's 
elderly lived in the hinterland, between 61 to 65 million elders. "If the age benchmark 
came down to 60, the elderly population amounted to some 10 per cent of all age groups, 
meaning that 91 to 97 million would be rural elders."32 This is a staggering number of 
people who cannot work in farming, and they need basic care. Less than 2.5 million 
elderly receive a pension or are supported by the local population. When they do receive 
funds, the amount is small, ranging from 20 to less than 100 yuan per month.33 Another 
target group is the disabled, difficult to integrate into the labor force and surprisingly 
numerous in China's rural areas. The underdevelopment of social care means that the 
aged, disabled and vulnerable persons depend mostly on their families. 
Whether one is talking about residential care, disability employment, relief grants 
or development loans, the numbers are remarkably small compared to the numbers of 
people they are designed to cover. Natural disaster relief seems to cover most recipients, 
but use of these funds is obviously limited. In the absence of adequate collective 
arrangements for welfare, individuals have few allies but themselves and their equally 
poor families to face the hazards of life. Despite general improvements in rural 
livelihood, poverty is still an important issue that must be addressed by the government. 
Stability 
The state's ability or willingness to redress regional inequalities has weakened 
32 Wong, 111. 
33 Ibid., 112. 
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noticeably, but in the interest of social stability, the Party must be willing to address the 
problem on a larger scale. Wide income inequalities increase a sense of grievance and 
injustice, a sense that has made it difficult to enact many policies. The most difficult has 
proven to be the implementation of taxes, which could help fund social programs. While 
the level of financial extraction as a percentage may seem acceptable by international 
standards, one should bear in mind that Chinese peasants do not understand why they are 
asked to pay, when in the past they have seen no results and they have so little to spare.34 
Compared to their urban counterparts, Chinese peasants receive few welfare benefits 
other than guaranteed access to land and believe (quite rightly) that they will need every 
fen to feed their families. For this reason, the central government has been hesitant to 
increase taxation or create an efficient taxation system. However, if stability in the 
hinterland is of so much importance to the Chinese government, it would seem that the 
Party would be interested in solving the problems of rural insurance in as expedient a 
manner as possible. 
Hospitals and Health 
Much has been made of the modernization of the Chinese health care system. 
The government is rightfully proud of its new, modem facilities. In addition to general 
hospitals, "various specialized hospitals of tumor, cardiovascular and cerebrovascular 
diseases, ophthalmologic and dental diseases, traditional Chinese medicine and infectious 
34 Ray Yep, Maintaining Stability in Rural China: Challenges and Responses, from the Center for 
Northeastern Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution. May 2002. 
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diseases can be found" 35 in Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing, Tianjin and other large cities. 
Medium-sized cities throughout China can claim to have some specialized, modem 
hospitals, but the farther outside of the cities and the farther into the hinterland one 
travels, the fewer medical facilities one is likely to see. Townships are lucky to have a 
small, unequipped clinic, and small rural villages more often than not have even less. 
The lack of cooperative medical systems in rural areas for many years left the 
state of clinics in disrepair. In 1993, 55 percent of villages had a functioning health 
station, and the quality of the station was suspect. The cost of building and equipping 
adequate stations is such that recovering from this decline is slow, especially without 
concerted support from the state. 36 
Perhaps because of the lack of proper medical supplies and machines, the 
government has chosen to shift focus to other aspects of health care. When it comes to 
the rural areas, the Chinese government has adopted the policy of "prevention first,"37 but 
there is little to back up that policy in the way of health or sanitation education, rendering 
the concept essentially meaningless. 
Government Allocations and Initiatives 
The government white paper on social security states that rural residents should 
seek "help from the clan," believing that programs in the hinterland should operate by the 
principle of "government relief, social mutual help, offspring support and stabilized land 
35 China Through a Lens, "Health and Medical Care." 
36 Yuanli Liu, William Hsiao and Karen Eggleston, "Equity in Health and Health Care: the 
Chinese Experience," Social Science and Medicine 49 (1999): 1354. 
37 China Through a Lens, "Health and Medical Care." 
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policy"38 Beyond this suggestion, it is stated that the state upholds the Five Guarantees, 
and that there are 24,000 homes for the elderly which provide accommodation for 
503,000 Five Guarantees citizens. 
The state has been carrying out several experiments in the realm of welfare, 
usually citing its success in numbers of people who have been entered into the system. 
In 2004, the Chinese government began to experiment with a system, to be funded jointly 
by the central and local governments, that supports and rewards households that practice 
family planning. Each person in a couple with only one child may receive a minimum of 
600 yuan a year, beginning at the age of 60 and continuing for the duration of his or her 
life. Officials brag that by the end of 2003, 12.57 million poverty-stricken people in rural 
China "enjoyed the minimum living allowance and subsistence relief for destitute 
households."39 
Three major concerns exist for the central government that complicate rural health 
insurance development: effectiveness of reforming the existing allocation processes, 
budget implications, and preventing an unbearable tax burden for the rural farmers. Given 
the experience of developing the urban social insurance system, with its many difficulties 
and challenges, the central government hesitates to take on the obviously greater 
responsibility of establishing health protection systems for the 800 million rural residents. 
The desire to delegate this responsibility to local governments remains a force. Farmers, 
for their part, are accustomed to being left to their own devices. Because the historical 
commitment to urban residents is not echoed in the state's relationship to the rural 
38 
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population, "no one, certainly not the rural farmers, expects the government to give the 
same kind of financial support to the rural health protection system as to the urban 
system."40 However, it must give something. 
Marketization of Health Care 
Among rural workers and farmers, only those who work for county and township 
governments have employer-provided insurance.41 Given that 70 percent of the rural 
population lives without health insurance, the state realized that it must take action to 
resolve the problem of the abandoned peasant class. The chosen solution to the problem 
of rural health care was the rural cooperative medical care system, initiated by the 
government in 2003: 
Based on major illness health insurance coverage, this 
cooperative medical care system follows a payment plan by 
the individual, financial support from the collective, and 
subsidies from the government. Once a farmer who has 
joined the cooperative medical care system is hospitalized, 
the cost incurred can be reimbursed according [to] a sliding 
scale. 42 
According to official estimates, this medical care system will cover the whole 
country by 2010. The number of pilot programs is growing rapidly, "with the number of 
new cooperatives set to grow to at least 500 in 2005 from the current 310 scattered across 
310 counties."43 Cooperatives have grown to cover 95.04 million farmers (approximately 
ten percent of the rural population). Approximately 72 percent (68.99 million) of these 
40 Liu and Hsiao, 28. 
41 Loraine A. West, "Shifting Boundaries," The China Business Review, 7 January 1998. 
42 China Through a Lens, "Health and Medical Care." 
43 China Through a Lens, "50% of Farmers Can't Afford to See Doctors," available from 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Nov/111377.htm; Internet. 6 November 2004. 
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farmers have joined the scheme. To date, 3.021 billion yuan in premiums has been 
collected, and by the end of June 2004, 1.394 billion yuan were disbursed- the result of 
the processing of 41.94 million claims. 44 In the meantime, China will establish a 
standardized medical-aid system for farmers with serious illnesses in rural areas 
nationwide. The state claims that it will establish a medical-aid fund for the purpose of 
funding these treatments, composed of government allocations and private donations.45 
The program is limited, and officials acknowledge there is still work to be done. 
According to Vice Minister of Health Zhu Qingsheng, "A more solid foundation will be 
laid for the full implementation of new program by setting rules, developing supporting 
policies and improving management."46 
Table 2. Health Care Spendin~ in China 
:Xgar 
1991 199S 2000 
China's GDP (in USO millions) 478,988 705,000 1,040,312 
Expenditure 
% of GOP spent on health 4.11 3.86 4.82 
%of total expenditure on health 22 17 14 
funded by the government 
% of total expenditure on health 38 50 60 
funded by individuals 
%of government health spending 75 72 70 
allocated to public health 
Source: Yuanli Liu, "China's Public Health-care System: Facing the Challenges," Policy 
and Practice, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, July 2004, 82 (7), 535. 
Note: Although percentage of GOP allocated by the government for health care has 
increased. it should be kept in mind that the costs of health care are simultaneously rising. 
44 Ibid. 
45 China Through a Lens, "Health and Medical Care." 
46 China Through a Lens, "50% of Farmers." 
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On the other hand, this program is being implemented at a time when government 
spending on health is decreasing. Total spending on health as a percentage of GDP has 
actually increased, but government spending as a share of total health spending has 
decreased (see table 2). In 2001, the total health expenditure per capita by the state was 
US$224, approximately 5.5 percent of GDP. Private expenditure was 62.8 percent of the 
total, and 95.4 percent of private expenses were paid out of pocket.47 The reduction in 
government spending has taken place "at a time when China's public health problems are 
becoming more complicated due to factors such as industrial pollution and the increasing 
mobility of a society as a result of the easing of restrictions on internal travel."48 The 
policy stipulates that the government will pay a 10-yuan (US$ 1.25) subsidy per person 
living in rural regions, which is to be matched by at least 10 yuan from the provincial and 
local government and at least 10 yuan from the family. The central government 
encourages the local governments to give more than the 10-yuan minimum. 
Unfortunately, the government-subsidized rural health insurance is only intended to help 
cover catastrophic medical expenses and does little to assist with more mundane health 
issues. 
Due to the central government's general reluctance to deal with the problem of 
rural health, the Ministry of Health's capacity to initiate and sustain public health 
programs has diminished. The ministry finds itself with limited financial resources and 
few national administrative mandates to support its actions. Shortly before the SARS 
47 World Health Organization, available from http://www3.who.int/ countries/chn/en/; Internet, 
accessed 1 December 2004. 
48 Yuanli Liu, "China's Public Health-care System: Facing the Challenges," Policy and Practice, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 82 (July 2004): 535. 
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epidemic in 2002, the State Council approved the establishment of the national Center for 
Disease Prevention and Control (China CDC), It was clearly too soon to be effective in 
combating SARS, but even now, a great deal of the infrastructure for a nationally 
integrated public health surveillance and response system has yet to be built.49 There is 
still much to be done to improve rural health care. Some of this responsibility will fall to 
the government. A good deal has been adopted by outside agencies with a desire to help. 
International organizations 
In 1998, the World Bank Group allocated $85 million for the Basic Health 
Services Program, to be distributed over six years. Its aim was to "alleviate poverty and 
promote human development by meeting the basic health needs of the rural poor,"50 and 
to improve public funding of social infrastructure through reform of the health finance 
system. In spite of these good intentions, this money only reached 10 provinces and 48 
million people. All programs have their limits, and no one program can hope to solve all 
of China's problems. However, significant action has been taken by international 
organizations, and they will continue to assist the government in providing for the people 
in whatever way possible. 
One notable regional project was the Qinghai Community Development Project. 
Its objectives were to establish income generating activities through cash-for-work 
programs to, to assist poor households to participate in farming income generating and 
improve access to water supply, to improve living standards and access to savings and 
49 Ibid., 533. 
50 The World Bank Group, "Investing in health Care for China's Rural Poor," 20 May 1998. 
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credit, to increase community development by training service institutions and to enable 
technical personnel to deliver services such as health and education. A self-evaluation of 
the results reveal consciousness of the limits on the effectiveness of any program, but 
also confidence and awareness of some success: "This evaluation report shows that this 
was a good project with a well balanced set of inputs and remarkable results - previously 
very poor villages have "opened up," with access to markets and microcredit."51 
Various United Nations organizations have focused on China, offering social 
development groups or giving women with incomes below the poverty line credit to 
invest in income generation. In 1994, the UN Development Program initiated its Poverty 
Alleviation Program.52 These programs all acknowledge successes as well as continued 
challenges to development. 
From the Heifer Project International, initiated in 1984 to provide livestock, to the 
Xinjiang Women's Income Generating Project, begun by the Canadian Development 
Agency to foster women's solidarity groups and provide job training, 53 countless 
organizations have recognized the problems with China's welfare system and found areas 
in which they could help. From this it is clear that if the Chinese government does not 
51 Australian Development Gateway, "AusAID Resources: Qinghai Community Development 
Project Evaluation Report," Internet: 
http://www .developmentgateway .com.au/jahia/Jahia!cache/offonce/lang/en/pid/ 1927, 9 Aug 
2004. 
52 United Nations Development Programme, "Country Cooperation Frameworks and Related 
Matters: Country Review Report for China," available from http://www.undp.org; Internet, 3 
December 1999. The program was aimed at group guarantees of loans, near commercial interest 
rates, a repayment schedule that starts very soon after the loan is made, and obligatory group 
savings, all focusing primarily on poor women. 
53 Wong, 108. 
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work to solve the problems of social security, it will not go unnoticed by the international 
community. 
Small private initiatives 
"From the vantage point of civil society, a welcome change is a new tolerance of the 
activities by autonomous social agencies, in addition to the state-controlled mass 
organizations."54 In Maoist China, private organizations and initiatives were suspect, but 
in today's China, private assistance with the welfare problem is welcomed. Voluntary 
agencies, both international and local, bring new approaches to the problem. For 
example, in 2002, 20 volunteer doctors from Harbin pledged to offer free treatment in 30 
counties for a period of six months. 55 Though these initiatives are limited in scope, they 
represent a new face of China, and a small step toward creating a population that 
recognizes the needs of rural China. The reason the doctors volunteered is simple. They 
recognize that health can be a deciding factor in a person's general well being.56 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that in sheer amount alone, the Chinese government has 
done a great deal in the past four years in an attempt to heal its ailing system. On a 
positive note, it can be said that the Chinese government in the twenty-first century has 
54 Ibid., 83. 
55 China Through a Lens, "Free Medical Care." Sponsored by China Primary Health Care 
Foundation, the project is set to cover a ten-year period, ending in 2012, rotating out the 
volunteers on a six-month timeline. 
56 Ibid. 
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made an effort to reform the existing social security system and has set down the building 
blocks of an efficiently operating infrastructure. Unfortunately, it remains clear that there 
are limits to this success. Almost nothing productive has been instituted in China's 
hinterland, and while the quality of life of the Chinese people is improving, a striking 
income gap remains. The majority of government publications extol the virtues of the 
state, enumerating the good policies that have been implemented by the government to 
aid the people. It is proud of its successes in urban unemployment and old-age insurance. 
Why then, is the state experiencing so much difficulty in reforming the rural situation? In 
the next chapter, obstacles to effective reform in China will be addressed, and the reasons 
for the insufficiency of programs detailed in this chapter will be discussed. 
CHAPTER4 
OBSTACLES AHEAD 
Looking solely at the government white paper, several problems immediately 
become evident. Perhaps the problem is that it is too sweeping, trying to cover every 
problem in general terms. Most of the programs give companies the option of not 
participating, such as the multi-level old-age insurance system/ and those that require 
participation seem to take at least 8 years to fully go into affect. The government's new 
social-pool-plus-personal accounts scheme, begun in 1997, is only available for those 
who have paid premiums for fifteen years, and therefore will not go into effect until 
2012.2 
In addition to the numerous minor technicalities and vague warnings that leave 
the citizen in actuality unprotected, there are two notable problems. First, the white paper 
never addresses the question of where to get the huge sums of money it allocates, or how 
to deal with the graft that is preventing funding from arriving in the hands of the poor. 
The largest problem is that in a white paper of its length, only a page is dedicated to the 
problems of the rural population. 
In 2002, China's health expenditures were 568.4 billion yuan (US$ 68 billion); 
however, the majority of this money is used in urban areas, ignoring the large majority of 
1 
"China's Social Security and Its Policy." 
2 Ibid. Other very limited temporary funds are available until participants are eligible to receive 
funds. 
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the country's population. No program is expected to fully cover rural residents until 
2010, and even then, farmers will have to pay out-of-pocket expenses.3 
Rural areas receive low funding, and "difficulties arise in strengthening the capacity 
building of rural healthcare and treatment systems and fund management, which are vital 
for the smooth development of the cooperative service, but may take time to develop.'>4 
Local governments are required to contribute, but have yet to actually significantly invest 
in projects in their provinces. The money they receive is often never reallocated to 
facilities that might provide care, and consequently, in most areas there are no facilities to 
which people might tum. In 2003, among all the illness related deaths in western and 
central China, "60 to 80 percent were in the home instead of in a hospital.''5 
Even as an employed urban resident, serious illnesses and pharmaceuticals are 
difficult to pay for. If it is expected that there be no coverage for people on the streets, 
those residents who have everything by Chinese standards, housing, a job, food on the 
table, still have to pay a vast majority of their medical expenses. In 2001, private 
expenditures on health were 62.8 percent of the total spent, with 95.4 percent of the 
private expenditures coming out-of-pocket, rather than from a private insurance 
company. The government expenditure on health was per capita USD 18.6 These figures 
raise the obvious question, why isn't the government fixing the problem? 
3 China Through a Lens, "50% of Farmers." 
"In 2003, the average annual income of a farmer was 2,622 yuan, and average in-patient hospital 
costs for that farmer were as high as 2,236 yuan. 
4 Ibid. Zhu Qingsheng, vice minister of health. 
5 Ibid. 
6 World Health Organization. Percentages based on most recent statistic. 
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Ineffective Problem Solving 
If the state wants to create an effective program for welfare, it must thoroughly 
examine the limits of the current system. Solutions offered thus far have been temporary 
and insufficient, from preferential treatment for certain groups to programs for pension 
reform. The first step on the road to a comprehensive system of welfare is to examine the 
faults of the existing structure in order to develop a way of operating without them. 
Preferential Treatment 
One key obstacle to creating a standardized welfare system is the existence of 
groups that receive preferential treatment, such as retired military personnel and the so-
called "Five Guarantees" households. The systems that have been implemented for these 
groups are not likely to be dismantled because of commitments made by the government 
of China; however, in order to create an equitable system, the policies must be 
incorporated rather than existing separately. This system, like other welfare systems the 
Chinese government has attempted to implement, is imperfect and unequal. The problem 
lies in the fact that the number of people receiving preferential relief has grown 
constantly every year, thus requiring an increase in funding, paid primarily by citizens 
who need support themselves: 
As far as collective funding is concerned, the masses have 
long shouldered aid to soldiers' families, poor households 
and 'five guarantee households' out of the welfare funds of 
production brigades and teams. After decollectivization, 
local communities paid for the support of needy groups 
through special levies, which can be regarded as a kind of 
welfare tax. As conditions across the country vary widely, 
actual methods of levying also differ. 7 
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Even if the Chinese government has decided that local welfare funds are the right way to 
solve the problem of providing for the poor, a new method is needed to determine who 
receives the funds. 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
Preferential treatment to retired servicemen is state policy. In 2004, the 
government allocated an additional 3 billion yuan in the budget for retired army officers.8 
The policy of providing for the families of ex-servicemen extends to former officers and 
veterans and gives assistance to the families of martyrs and servicemen, disabled or not. 
In addition to financial assistance, the government provides medical care, housing 
arrangements, job placement and convalescent homes for disabled servicemen.9 
However, most work units avoid participating in these job placement programs if 
possible because they are already overstaffed. Veterans want to be posted in lucrative 
jobs, and are unsatisfied when placed as production workers or in other low-salaried 
positions. Because financial assistance depends on village and township resources, this 
funding, like in other programs, is highly variable, resulting in dissatisfaction and 
insufficient provisions for those who are disabled. 10 Unfortunately, due to a need for 
incentives in recruitment, it would be difficult to dismantle this policy, so it would seem 
that any welfare system must add provisions for PLA soldiers. 
7 Wong, 75. 
8 People's Daily (China), The Draft Central and Local Budgets for 2004. 
9 Leung, 123. 
10 Wong, 88. 
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Five Guarantees 
Those who qualify for the "five guarantees" program are the elderly, disabled and 
orphans, but because of stringent criteria, only a small number (less than 3 million) of 
these people qualify for aid. It is unfortunately limited, given that it is the basis of social 
relief in rural areas. Among those who qualify, only 75 to 80 percent actually receive the 
five guarantees of food, fuel, clothing, education and burial. 11 
Lack of State Support 
The government has touted its local poverty alleviation projects, insisting that the 
local governments have the welfare situation under control. In fact, though it can show 
off new wells, fruit trees and model villages with new houses boasting "shiny white tiles 
and televisions,"12 the people remain dissatisfied. A young resident of Ningxia Province, 
whose parents left her village to find jobs that could pay for her school fees, has been left 
at home to tend their land and the cows. "This project hasn't really made us satisfied 
with our lives. I have enough to eat, but I have no energy," she said. "We've told the 
government about our situation, but they haven't helped."13 
In spite of constant assurances that the central government is behind the various 
plans to improve health care and welfare, little support has actually been given. For 
example, in the rural health sector, the government has intervened only to provide some 
11 Wong, 48. 
12 Louisa Lim, "China's Rural Poor Left Behind," BBC News, 22 September 2004. 
13 Lim. 
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capital investment, training and medical education. Financing remains largely private 
and unorganized. 14 
Because these programs are all optional, businesses and local governments tend to 
avoid investing in any scheme that might deplete their profits. Take health reform, for 
example: "To be sure, the 1997 Central Party Committee and State Council Decisions on 
Health Sector Reform and Development did recognize the potential of rural cooperative 
medical services (RCMS) and included a provision, specifying the voluntary nature."15 
The government can urge organizations to assist the poor all it wants, but it never 
coordinates programs or gives these bodies any responsibility. This is why many 
uninsured families in the countryside have suffered from lack of financial access to 
necessary medical services. Contradictory policies have crippled the cooperative medical 
system. According to the State Council policy of reducing farmers' tax burden, it is 
illegal to collect RCMS contributions.16 However: "In 1994, the government said we 
wouldn't have to pay taxes any more, but it never happened," claimed Jin Xiaoting, 
another Ningxia peasant. 17 The farmers are still paying taxes, and those taxes, notably, 
are not going into schemes to help the rural poor. These people are being used to 
subsidize the modernization of the cities; they are bitter because they see no benefit from 
taxes they are still forced to pay. RCMS would certainly be easier to accept than paying 
taxes to provide streetlights in Shanghai. 
14 Liu and Hsiao, 32. 
15 Ibid, 33. 
16 Ibid. 
I7Lim. 
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The voluntary nature of welfare schemes in China is perhaps the most pressing 
problem facing those concerned with reform. Enterprises are not likely to willingly give 
up earnings in order to support people if even the government does not care sincerely for 
their well-being. Because the situation is so complex and muddled, the central 
government is hesitant to take on a role to organize this and make it better, but at least 
from a policy sense, it must. 
Limits to the Two Ensures 
Three years into the Two Ensures project, it can be said that a significant 
contribution has been made to helping promote development, deepen reform and stabilize 
society. It has moved toward the setting up of a mechanism for taking care of retirees and 
the elderly in which the ideal condition of common responsibility (shared by the state, the 
employment unit and the workers themselves) is met. 
Nevertheless, certain problems have been discovered in the process of the 
implementation of this mechanism. For example, some workers who were laid off from 
collectively-owned enterprises were not eligible under the system to submit applications 
for re-employment, and therefore were not guaranteed their minimal costs of living; 
whereas some enterprises did not participate in the general social plan for retirement 
insurance at all. In certain regions, owing to insufficient funds, those workers who 
submitted their applications for funds after being laid-off have not been paid their basic 
living subsidies, either to the full amount or in a timely manner. The late-payment or 
54 
even non-payment of retirement funds has piled up since before 1998,18 and so far the 
state has been unable to completely deal with all of the backlogged cases. 
Problems lie chiefly in that the "original intent of the system, as it was designed-
that there would be "partial accumulation"- has simply not been realized."19 The plan 
was that funds that were created through the setting up of individual accounts and those 
created through overall social planning were to be used to make retirement or pension 
payments to the individual retiree that set up the account. In reality there was not enough 
in savings to make payments to those immediately in need. Over the life of the project, 
the central government has invested approximately 81.9 billion yuan; however, in spite of 
this aid, the gap between revenues and expenditures in the area of retirement insurance 
has been increasing each year, from over 10 billion yuan in 1998 to over 40 billion yuan 
in 2000.20 Given that the amount per month that must be paid nationally toward 
retirement pensions is roughly 16 to 17 billion yuan, there was only enough money 
accumulated to make payments for 4.7 months.21 More than 190 billion yuan had to be 
taken out of individual accounts in order to make good on immediate payments to recent 
retirees. The individual accounts have no accumulation in them and are therefore "empty 
accounts." 
The project could potentially be dismissed based on the grounds that it did not 
achieve its goals, but it should be remembered that, according to the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Security, "the Two Ensures project is a transitional, perhaps even a "stop-gap" 
18 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. In 2000, as many as 24 of the provinces and regions in China were in deficit. 
21 Ibid. 
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measure. From a long-term development perspective, we cannot stop with this, but must 
look toward the future in the direction of full stabilization and standardization."22 The 
Two Ensures project was never intended to be fully functional, and it still requires a more 
comprehensive, well-organized plan to replace it. 
Obstacles to Overcome 
The Chinese government faces several large obstacles that it must overcome 
before it will be able to establish a safety net to catch the large majority of its people. 
The largest, as we have seen, is that the state has not saved (or accumulated funds) for the 
purpose of social security and health insurance programs. Prior to reform, all profits 
from state-owned and -operated enterprises were surrendered to the state, to be used as it 
saw fit. Nothing was put aside for the workers upon retirement. Consequently, today the 
payments of social security-related money that ought to be made nation-wide annually to 
eligible workers amounts to roughly 200 billion yuan; the annual revenue is less than 160 
billion yuan.23 This deficit situation is becoming more and more serious as spending in 
other areas increases. 
The central government has simply not given sufficient attention to the 
construction of a welfare system, previously putting it low on the agenda in terms of 
overall social and economic development. This choice has allowed the obstacles in front 
of the nation's politicians to grow to new heights, and now even the most stringent 
campaigns face difficulty in toppling them. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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Corruption 
For the Party, the root causes of the crisis are greed and abuse of power in local 
administrations. Major accusations in the campaign against the corruption of local 
officials include: "(1) over-staffing bureaucracy and poor fiscal discipline (leading to an 
insatiable drive for revenues); (2) arbitrariness in imposing fines and charges; (3) 
individual corruption and misappropriation of funds; and ( 4) insensitivity to local 
sentiments. "24 
In an audit of the 2003 budget implementation in 55 ministries and commissions 
under the State Council, widespread embezzlement and fraud were discovered. This 
problem did not solely concern local governments. Although Auditor-General Li Jinhua 
cited cases such as one in Funan County of Anhui Province, in which 17 cadres pocketed 
200,000 yuan (over 24,180 US dollars) earmarked for the resettlement of people after the 
Huaihe River flooded, he does not spare the central government. According to the audit, 
41 ministries and commissions embezzled as much as 1.42 billion yuan in order to 
construct residence and office buildings for their own departments. There were also 
problems with insufficient use of funds: in 2003, the Ministry of Finance allocated 3.114 
billion yuan for construction projects; however, only 1.262 yuan was used. 25 
For the central government, however, the major culprit is local administration. 
The state allocates sufficient funding, but most of the money does not make it past the 
24 Yep. 
25 People's Daily (China), "Embezzlement, Fraud Exist in Implementation of Central Budget," 24 
June 2004. 
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local officials to reach the people. In this case, the problem is not a lack of funding, but 
of fund management. Whether or not corruption in the central government is a 
significant factor, it cannot be denied that local corruption is running rampant. In 
Yunnan Province, disaster relief funding allocated to assist earthquake victims has found 
itself sitting in county coffers. The central finance department budgeted 120 million yuan 
( 14.5 million US dollars) to earthquake-hit areas, but 51.7 4 million yuan ( 6.2 million US 
dollars) never reached the people. Some departments even used the fund to balance the 
local budget or build restaurants.26 
No area of welfare remains untouched by corruption. In pension plans, the state 
recommends that funds be issued in government bonds rather than stocks in order to 
reduce the risk of corruption and misinvestment. "Even so, in 1998 state auditors 
discovered that about 10 billion yuan in the pension funds had been misappropriated.'m 
For Beijing, the solution lies in tightening control over rural officials, through a 
combination of political, administrative and fiscal reforms. Campaigns against 
corruption have thus far only affected unimportant lower officials, leaving some of the 
more flagrant violators to continue in graft and corruption. Dealing with the big 
criminals may prove more difficult politically. 
Aging 
Demographics are a serious obstacle to reform of the social security system in 
China. Already, the number of people who are at least 65 years of age has reached 88.11 
26 
"Embezzlement, Fraud Exist." 
27 Leung, 80. 
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million. Geriatrification will most likely reach its peak in the 2030s, indicating that the 
prospect of caring for the elderly, rather than getting easier, will only become grimmer. 
88.11 million is an enormous number of elderly people. This growth is taking place at a 
speed particular to China alone. Owing to the period during which the one-child policy 
was more strictly enforced than it is today, the population is aging faster than that of any 
other nation: "In advanced and developed countries in general, it takes roughly forty 
years, or perhaps even half a century's time, for the proportion of the 60-and-above age 
group to move from 5% to 10% of the overall population."28 In China, the elderly age 
group increased from 4.9 percent of the total population in 1982 to 10 percent in 1999- a 
mere eighteen years.29 Most of these advanced nations industrialized and created 
relatively successful social programs before having to face the challenges of 
geriatrification; China still has a poor social-economic base for dealing with the problem 
of aging, and the elderly population is already waiting. 
China has so far been unable to develop an effective system for those who do 
work and have saved; therefore, it can hardly be expected to be able to provide for those 
who are not working. In addition to the rapidly growing numbers of retirees, there are 
those in the countryside who can no longer work on their family plots. There are the 
disabled, who could never work. With a situation that strongly resembles the ancient 
28 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
29 Although this could to some extent be attributed to better general health care in China, it is 
likely that the increase is due in large part to the lack of social trauma and starvation that afflicted 
the generations before them in the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. The weak (very 
young and very old) were more likely to die during these periods, and in a more stable China, an 
elderly person is less subject to duress. 
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saying, "Many come to the table to be fed; few are those producing in the field,"30 it is no 
surprise that the government has placed the burden of caring for this population on the 
family unit for so long. 
The Limits of Familism 
Even while attempting other reforms, the Chinese government continues to fall back 
upon the principle of familism. Since 1996, a law has been on the books requiring adult 
Chinese to provide for the care and well-being of their elderly parents, "comforting them 
and catering to their special needs." 31 This is difficult to carry out for several reasons. 
Although the majority of the 120 to 140 million workers who have left home seeking 
factory work do send money home, in many cases, their incomes are usually insufficient. 
The law also remains vague on requirements of how much assistance is enough. It 
requires that people also assist in caring for their in-laws, adding to the burden of young 
people, who in many cases are more concerned with making a life for themselves in the 
new society than sending a large portion of their hard-earned incomes back to the 
countryside. These people have their lives, and it is difficult for the state to persuade 
them that the old Confucian principle of filial piety still applies. 
For Chinese who do have family to support them, the core problem lies with the 
one-child policy. Although it is generally agreed that China must take action to curb its 
population increase, the one-child policy seems to come with more problems than 
solutions. In the short-run, major concerns included the abuse of wives who "could not" 
give birth to boys, abandonment of female and handicapped babies, and female 
30 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
31 Johnson. 
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infanticide,32 which create problems in the principle of familism by themselves. Deeper 
worries have begun to surface: "When the new family pattern- the four (grannies) two 
(parents) and one (child) family- takes shape, domestic resources will be hard stretched 
to cater for dependent elders.'m Young adults are now faced not only with finding 
enough for themselves and their child, but also the four parents who have no other 
children on which they can rely. This becomes more difficult when disease and 
disability are factored in. Children can barely afford to provide for their parents when 
they are healthy and receiving limited pensions from their years of employment. For 
families that are barely subsisting, a disease can quickly plunge it into poverty from 
which they cannot recover. It is clear that the one-child policy is perpetuating the 
problem of welfare, raising the question: should the government be rewarding those who 
comply while insisting that people rely on their families for welfare? 
It is clear that relying on familism does not work when the family size is 
decreasing, and it should be even more evident that familism finds its limit in dealing 
with orphans, migrants turned beggars and the poor more generally. If the family is 
intended to be the main source of support, these people are left out in the cold. Without a 
family to provide for them, or with a family that needs support itself, these people need 
an alternative to this policy. 
32 These have remained problems, as evidenced by United Way slogans painted on storefronts in 
the countryside; for example: "Giving birth to a girl is just as good as giving birth to a boy," or 
"Girls also deserve your love and care." 
33 Wong, 70. 
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Deferment to Local Governments 
Interestingly enough, it seems that the common people generally believe that the 
central government's policies are adequate. However, whether or not the local 
government follows them is a different question. This suggests that to some extent, the 
people are buying into Party rhetoric claiming limited corruption exists on the periphery, 
but not in the center. According to peasant Jin Xiaoting, the state's decision to defer 
responsibility for welfare to the provincial and local governments was a mistake: "The 
central government's policies are good, but local officials don't usually follow them."34 
The central body continues to provide monetarily for the periphery, but does little to 
supervise the programs that local governments are supposed to implement. 
The government began to decentralize in order "to rectify some of the 
irrationalities and inefficiencies that developed under the highly centralized planning 
system."35 This particular reform has weakened vertical lines of control and 
communication in every sector. In health care specifically, a reduction in national 
government's involvement and spending has come at a time when China's public health 
problems are becoming more complicated. Industrial pollution and a mobile population 
have made health problems much more widespread, but the government has become 
increasingly incapable of dealing with this.36 
Decentralization leads to a weak center, making it easier for corrupt officials to 
flourish and more difficult for policies to be properly implemented. Local governments 
34 Lim. 
35 Liu, Yuanli, 533. 
36 Liu, Yuanli, 535. 
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are more concerned with their own budgets and local control than obeying directives 
from the center. This problem has become more and more pronounced in China in recent 
years. More generally, diffusing responsibility across ministries and provinces reinforces 
the marginal nature of welfare support. For people who work, social and labor insurance 
are realistic possibilities. The responsibility for this "normal population" has been given 
to three different ministries, while the relatively weak Ministry of Civil Affairs has been 
put in charge of all social welfare. This ministry is weak in the provinces compared to 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and cannot hope to be effective without 
support on the nationallevel.37 
If the state wishes to make welfare and health care priorities for reform, then it 
must work to reduce inequalities in services and variations in investments across 
provinces, cities and towns. Decentralization cannot be effective without appropriate 
mechanisms to transfer payments and enforce cooperation. For example, even though 
each county has an epidemic prevention station, some of them are barely functioning due 
to under-funding and a lack of coordination among rural health-care providers. There is 
no supervision, and public health work at the township and village level remains weak.38 
Leaving everything to the provincial and local governments is a dangerous decision that 
leaves millions coping with sub-par care. At this point, the provinces operate more like 
colonies when it comes to obeying the center. In spite of relatively effective reforms 
such as the 1994 tax reform, which gave the central government a larger percentage of 
the revenue and was well-enforced, the Chinese government has a long way yet to go. If 
37 Responsibilities of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Appendix B) 
38 Liu, Yuanli, 534. 
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the state's actions to further reconsolidate power are not effective, it may never be able to 
fix China's problems. 
Who is Being Left Behind? 
Primarily because of the deferment to local areas, poor areas remain poor, uncared 
for and often unhealthy. Those provinces and cities with a poor tax base are unable to 
raise the money necessary for social programs. Unlike provinces like Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu and cities like Shanghai and Beijing, only half of villages in the western 
provinces have medical facilities. Those villages that can boast a clinic usually have poor 
equipment and are staffed by unqualified employees. In Tibet, Qinghai and Xinjiang, the 
life span is six to nine years lower than the national average. 39 Keeping in mind that poor 
health is one of the leading causes of poverty, from disparities in health care alone it can 
be seen that China has a long way to go in improving social security. 
The government acknowledges this problem. Although cadres still brag of the 
improved availability of quality health services, it has been said of the latest rural 
insurance scheme: "We should have a clear mind that there are still some problems, such 
as poor public awareness, laggard rural medical capacity, and potential risks in the 
management of (cooperative) funds due to lack of qualifications."40 In the countryside, 
those who see doctors are still those who can afford to pay. In Ningxia, Jin Xiaoting's 
wife, Ma Yulian, suffers from a huge growth in her stomach. Her stomach has ached 
39 China Through a Lens, "Attention Urged to People's Health in Western Areas." Available 
from http://www.china.org.cn/english; Internet. 21 March 2001. 
40 China Through a Lens, "50% of Farmers," Zhu Qingsheng 
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constantly for years, but this family, living in a cave in order to avoid property taxes they 
cannot pay, cannot afford to take her to a doctor: "'I was so sick that I even went blind 
for some time,' she said. 'I can't sleep at night because of the pain. But I have no money 
to treat my disease. "'41 
In spite of modernizations in the medical system, total health-care utilization has 
been falling due to increased costs of medical care without insurance. Poorer households 
use fewer medical resources, mostly because the nascent rural insurance system cannot 
yet provide beyond money for emergency treatments. A shocking number of illness-
related deaths take place at home, and on average 45 percent of the hospital discharges in 
rural China are initiated by patients against medical advice. For nearly 80 percent of 
these discharges, the reason given was that patients could not afford to stay any longer.42 
Compounding this problem, health-care providers have become less interested in public 
health work. There is simply no money in preventative services, and trained physicians 
are under increasing pressure to make money in the cities treating those with insurance. 
China's rural poor are left behind in almost every aspect of life. Without proper 
health care or at least money from the government to get them on their feet, they can 
never hope to rise in the capitalist system, or even to create a good life for their families. 
They cannot send their children to good colleges without tuition money, cannot save the 
lives of family members without money for expensive treatments.43 In spite of its many 
improvements, Deng Xiaoping's policy of letting a few get rich then allowing others to 
41 Lim. 
42 Liu, Yuanli. 
43 Liu Yan, interview by the author, Hangzhou, China, informal, 14 November 2004. 
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follow has in actuality had the consequence of leaving millions behind. Their lives may 
not be worse than they were pre-reform, but they are certainly not better. 
Conclusion 
There are many problems associated with creating social programs to provide for 
the people of a developing country, and China has so many that it seems to be facing an 
insurmountable challenge. Rather than improving, problems in rural programs have 
continued to daunt reformers, and participation in existing urban programs has actually 
decreased, mainly due to resistance in the non-state sector and a shrinking number of 
people employed by S0Es.44 When the state focuses its attention on increasing the 
numbers, there seems to be some effect, but only by changing the attitudes of those in 
control of the system can any real headway be made. Some of the younger, more self-
sufficient enterprises lack a sense of the value of having a social security system, and 
some enterprises, even though they participate in social security schemes, nonetheless do 
not contribute their share even though they are financially able to do so. The reason 
behind this is simply that the pursuit of maximizing their profits takes priority over the 
importance of providing for their employees.45 
Within the new capitalist system, there is an outlook of independence. People are 
out to improve their lives without real concern for others. So many people live in 
poverty, and if the government does not take action, they will remain there. The 
44 Leung, "Only in 1999, with the government effort to extend to other non-state sectors, did the 
number of employees participating in the unified funds show significant increases. But again, the 
figure in 2000 showed a reduction." 
45 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
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problems that face the state are indeed intimidating, but they are not necessarily 
impossible to solve. For China to truly enter the world it needs more than economic 
success; the central government is aware that it must meet the challenges posed by social 
security in order to keep face. It needs to develop a strategy for dealing with problems on 
the periphery, reasserting central control in order to create a nation of strong, thriving 
citizens. 
CHAPTERS 
ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS 
Harvard public health professor William Hsaio asserts that any country desiring to 
reform its health care system must ask itself three policy questions: 1) What proportion of 
the nation's total resources are to be spent on health care; 2) How and by whom should 
scarce resources be allocated among programs and regions; 3) Which system would 
obtain maximum efficiency in production (nature of ownership, compensation methods, 
etc.).' China does need health care reform, but taken more broadly, these are also the 
steps that should be considered before reforming a nation's welfare system overall. In 
China's case, the government has answered these questions, but in ways that seem to 
need revision. China's national budget raises the delicate question of whether or not 
health and prosperity are more important than a powerful, modernized military, and the 
choice of leaving allocation to the local governments is clearly flawed. 
This chapter attempts to answer these questions in a way that could help China 
reform and augment its existing system. In addition, it presents conclusions and solutions 
to the problems of welfare offered by various researchers. Although it would be difficult 
to pick the best solution for a country as large and geographically diverse as China, an 
analysis of these solutions will ideally provide answers to some of the big questions 
surrounding welfare reform. 
1 William C. Hsiao, "Comparing Health Care Systems: What Nations Can Learn from One 
Another," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 17, no. 4. (Winter 1992), 16-7. 
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Potential Solutions 
There are many different options when it comes to reforming a social security 
system, and regarding China, all of them have been offered. However, some common 
themes emerge in these suggestions, giving rise to the hope that the central government 
will be able to combine them in some fashion to create a viable restructuring method. 
Pension 
From the perspective of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, if China 
wishes to meet the requirements of creating a modern enterprise system, it should 
establish a "social security system that will be independent of the enterprises, and 
gradually bring about a merging of the system of guaranteeing the basic ... livelihood of 
the workers who have been laid off with the system of unemployment insurance."2 This 
is an admirable sentiment with some practical elements, but a government requires policy 
to move in this direction. The state has adopted a two-pillar approach- "one publicly 
managed and tax or pay-as-you-go financed, with a redistributive or poverty-prevention 
objective, the other privately managed, with the object of building and managing 
retirement savings."3 The shift is designed to avoid the increase of taxes as the 
population ages and to increase accumulation of capital for the long-term. In addition, 
the state suggests those enterprises with sufficient financial resources set up 
2Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
3 Estelle James, How Can China Solve its Old Age Security Problem? The Interaction Between 
Pension, SOE and Financial Market Reform, draft to be presented at the Conference on Financial 
Sector reform in China, Harvard School of Public Health, Cambridge, Ma., 11-13 September 
2001. 
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supplementary retirement or pension insurance plans for their workers.4 This is, of 
course, merely a suggestion. 
One proposed solution, contrary to the government's current plan, is not to make 
the system independent of the enterprises, but rather to require these enterprises to 
participate. As it is, many private businesses refuse to pay social insurance payments and 
many SOEs are unable to afford the 35 percent of payroll requested by the state.5 If 
payments were made mandatory and the percent required was lowered to a reasonable 
percentage (under 10 percent), the central government could dramatically increase 
funding for social security. Another way to maintain the flow of money into the pool 
while decreasing the money being paid out annually, the government could also extend 
the retirement age. Currently, people are retiring before they are unable to work in order 
to make room for the next generation, but with China's geriatrification, this is becoming 
increasingly unnecessary.6 If older but able-bodied workers have retired and receive no 
pension, society faces the same problem as it would if younger people were unemployed 
and receiving no benefits. The success of a plan allowing people to remain longer in the 
workforce would be contingent upon the Chinese economy continuing to generate new 
jobs for the young; however, even if it did not do so, if Chinese citizens were to retire 
later, they would be able to help the pension program get on its feet by paying into the 
fund for a longer period of time. 
4 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
5 Leong and Frost. 
6 Leung. 
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Health Care 
To ameliorate under-utilization of health-care, financial barriers to access must be 
reduced. In its recent white paper, China announced new health insurance policies for 
rural residents. However, this government-subsidized insurance only covers catastrophic 
medical expenses, leaving people uncovered for mild illnesses and preventative 
treatments, such as vaccines. 7 At the same time, funding has continued to go to 
modernizing hospitals. This practice is typical of developing nations that politicize 
health care funding, showing a desire to brag about their state-of-the-art hospitals, even 
while their people are unable to afford access to basic care. Like many nations, a large 
percent of China's health budget goes into hospital improvement (see table 3). Instead, 
the government should be putting more into basic health services and prevention 
Table 3. Share of Government Budget Allocated to Hospitals for Selected Countries 
Country Hospital Share* 
Bangladesh 61% 
Burundi 66% 
China 61% 
Cote D'Ivoire 46% 
Ethiopia 49% 
Jamaica 72% 
Mexico 58% 
Philippines 71% 
Somalia 70% 
Turkey 63% 
Zimbabwe 54% 
OECD** mean 54% 
* Share of Allocated Health Budget 
** Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Source: Roberts, et al. Getting Health Reform Right, 183. Originally from Bamam, Howard and 
Joseph Kutzin, Public Hospitals in Developing Countries: Resource Use, Cost and Financing, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. 1993. 
7 Liu, Yuanli, 535-6. 
71 
programs in its poorer regions. Typically, when a government only has enough money to 
put into either basic health or hospitals, it chooses hospitals. However, studies have 
shown that people are willing to pay for hospital care when the situation is serious, but 
will not go to regular practitioners unless the visit is subsidized. Given that these visits 
can help prevent more serious problems and outbreaks, funding basic health services is a 
cost-effective choice.8 
Commitment to a Plan 
It would seem that the government is on-track with its RCMS scheme, if only it 
would give the system the support it needs to be effective. Lack of coordination of 
policies threatens to cripple the program,9 but if the government can decide on how much 
to collect through taxes and how to invest the money collected, the program could be the 
best option for rural health care. 10 In order to stabilize the system, the number of people 
paying into each cooperative should be increased. If each program exists on merely the 
village level, not enough people are paying in to sustain a health crisis. The program 
should combine the funds collected from individuals province-wide in order to create a 
sufficiently stable pool from which money can be drawn when needed. 
8 Marc Roberts, et al, Getting Health Reform Right: A Guide to Improving Performance and 
Equity, (New York: Oxford U P, 2003). 
9 It should not, for example, be illegal under the State Council policy of reducing farmers' tax 
burden to collect contributions to RCMS, while other bodies espouse the program. 
10 Liu and Hsiao. 
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Incentives to Help 
More liberal researchers have suggested that in order to fix China's health 
problems, the state government should make policies to attract medical school graduates 
to the Western provinces, adding that medical colleges should enroll more students 
coming from the West (and of course provide incentives for them to return home after 
completing their studies). 11 In addition, it has been suggested that wealthy hospitals 
donate equipment to rural Western clinics. Given the current state of affairs in China, 
this seems like a lot of philanthropy to ask of people and regions that are trying to secure 
their own quality of life. On the other hand, China already has an incentive program for 
doctors, providing salary bonuses based on number of patients seen or revenue generated 
for the hospital. 12 To add another bonus for doctors who practice in rural areas seems like 
a minor- and yet considerably helpful -change. 
General Reform 
Another option for alleviating the burden of the state would be to reduce the 
constraints on national nonprofits and international organizations that would be willing to 
assist the poor. This could help deal with the problem of providing for those who cannot 
work because of disability or have never paid into a pension or insurance scheme. In 
recent years, China has noticeably relaxed restrictions against non-governmental 
organizations, but there are still comparatively few voluntary, non-state organizations that 
function within China. Most are state-sponsored, and those non-state operations that do 
11 
"Attention Urged to People's Health." 
12 Roberts, 199. 
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exist are kept on a short leash by the government: "In spite of their deep involvement in 
social care, the freedom of mass agencies to do as they please may be subject to recall."13 
Allowing them to operate in poorer areas could significantly reduce the burden felt by 
farmers and families of those who cannot work. 
Inequality 
Perhaps one of the most pressing issues the central government must solve is 
inequality in its welfare policy. China's current policy is dependent upon employment, 
social, economic and regional differences. Granted, politics are often influenced by urban 
elites, but it is the responsibility of the state to ensure protection of all citizens, especially 
those who truly need assistance. There are still huge gaps in rural care. The bias in 
social funding naturally tends to people who can work, but the people who cannot work 
or work in the highly variable agricultural sector should not be punished. 14 
Non-regional poor are hit most severely by inequitable policies. Poor farmers and 
beggars in Zhejiang Province pay three times the taxes and fees per capita than regional 
poor, and they also must pay more for goods in such a wealthy province. 15 Meanwhile, 
non-poor living in poorer areas of Sichuan receive the same subsidies as the poor of that 
province, simply because most government polices make distinctions based on region. 16 
Although regional poverty is a factor, the government must stop making taxation and 
13 Wong, 213. 
14 Wong, 207. 
15 Riskin and Shi. 343. 
16 These include subsidies on education intended for minority peoples, lower taxes and housing 
subsidies. In addition, in 1996, the state required wealthy provinces to give all that it could to 
help a designated poor province (the principle ofjupin xiezuo, or "partnership in poverty 
alleviation"), cutting off programs for the poor in their own region. (See Appendix C) 
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funding choices based solely on region and start looking at people based on income; it 
needs to create a policy that does not further increase already rampant inequality. This 
will require significant developments in institutional capacity and an effective way to 
gather data concerning household income. 
Central Control 
None of the solutions offered above are viable without increased government 
control over reform. History has been shown that local governments and enterprises in 
China will not cooperate unless the state demands and supervises cooperation or provides 
incentives. In any decentralized scheme, a nation's ability to implement programs 
depends on capacity and leadership at the local level, which implies a need to invest in 
building the capacity of the periphery: 
Some local areas may not be able to adopt community 
financing ... Central governments thus need to consider the 
limits of the organizational and technical capacity available 
locally when designing such schemes. They may well need 
to supply the missing expertise, and provide organizational 
support either temporarily or permanently ... 17 
Local areas in China also have a particular problem with corruption. Increased state 
supervision is necessary to prevent local officials from siphoning off money for their own 
purposes. Although workers' direct involvement in monitoring where their taxes go 
could be helpful, 18 it is more likely that the state will be forced to take direct control over 
17 Roberts, 178. 
18 Leong and Frost. 
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social programs in order to adequately allocate funds and put a stop to corruption. This is 
not to say that there is not a problem of corruption in the central government, but perhaps 
if programs came under central control, it would be easier to hold guilty parties 
accountable, as they would be more visible to the public eye. 
China needs to consider the nationalization of programs such as its public health 
system in order to strengthen vertical communications and controls. One of the most 
serious obstacles to the smooth functioning of government is lack of communication. 
Partial nationalization would improve the capacity of national-level ministries to 
supervise and guide regional and local programs in social security and public health, as 
well as give local officials incentive to report to upper levels of government. 19 Perhaps 
then, corruption could be largely curbed and effective solutions to local problems could 
be worked out through the cooperation between various levels of specific ministries . 
... Or They'll Do it For You 
If China's government cannot figure out a way to communicate with its local 
branches and solve the problems of social security, foreign companies are more than 
willing to enter into the market. Even now, foreign insurance companies, such as 
American International Group, Inc. (AIG), and multilateral agencies are lobbying the 
government to open the insurance market.20 They see great market potential in old age 
and medical insurance in China. 
Their participation could potentially be very helpful in upgrading management 
and efficiency. These companies, such as Accenture, are more experienced than the 
19 Liu, Yuanli, 533. 
20 Leong and Frost. 
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Chinese government, and, with a growing demand for professional services, may be able 
to import relevant overseas models to create a well-regulated social security system.21 
Allowing these companies to come in and invest requires a shift in the government's role. 
It would be a service provider instead of a regulator, whereas investing companies, as 
owners and shareholders of the fund, "have the right to know about and supervise the 
management of the fund and the government should bring them satisfactory results.'m 
This option certainly creates a need for better regulation and requires strong executive 
leadership. 
Financial Viability 
Any solution offered inevitably raises the question of funding. It is estimated that 
in order to fund social security deficits of approximately 500 billion yuan, "the 
government will have to sell its state-owned assets over time."23 However, for China the 
problem is not a lack of money, but rather a problem of corruption and a question of 
priorities. Although in absolute terms, the amount spent on social programs has 
significantly increased (see table 4), this is merely indicative of an increased central 
budget. In addition to the problem that a large percentage of the money budgeted for 
health, education and social security never reach the people, for the central government 
the decision between social programs and the military remains unsatisfactorily made. In 
21 China Economic Net, "Foreign Companies Eye Social Security Fund Market," available from 
http:/ /en.ce.cn/Markets/Equities/200409/20/t20040920_1804797 .shtml; Internet. accessed 20 
September 2004. 
22 China Economic Net. 
23 Leung, 81. 
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Table 4. Government Expenditures for Pensions and Social Welfare 
Pensions for 
Handicapped Pensions Social Welfare Expenses 
Year & Bereaved for Retirees and Relief Funds on Disaster Relief Other 
F T s 
1980 4.51 3.41 5.36 7.03 
1985 7.13 4.88 7.71 10.25 
1990 16.61 9.60 12.07 13.38 
1995 29.11 22.78 24.19 27.27 
1998 40.38 16.24 35.29 52.32 
2000 59.72 23.72 59.71 28.73 
2002 60.03 41.28 141.63 32.93 
Source: China Through a Lens, "People's Life and Social Security," available from 
www.china.org.cn/englishlen-shuzi2004/sh/sh-sh.htm: Internet. Accessed 20 March 2005. 
1.18 
3.43 
12.11 
27.03 
41.15 
97.10 
2004, the percentage of the central government's budget that went to defense was 12.17, 
an increase of 21.83 billion yuan over the 185.3 billion budgeted in 2003 (at which point 
it was 11.5 percent of the budget). In contrast, a mere 5.8 percent of the 2004 budget 
went to employment programs and social security, and 5.6 percent went to education, 
health, science and technology, and culture and sports combined.24 If the government so 
chose, it could allocate more of the budget to health and employment work per year. 
However, given China's history and need to present a modem military force to Taiwan, 
this is an unlikely policy reversal. Given this choice, and given that the current 
crackdown on corruption has not been sufficient, the government must examine other 
options for funding. One of these would be to allow foreign companies into the process, 
as stated above, but for financial purposes, the best decision would be tax reform. 
24 The Draft Central and Local Budgets. 
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Taxation 
In the past, in order to avoid imposing more taxes, China has resorted to 
temporary levies. However, raising local funds through levies is not a good method of 
financing, because of their ad hoc nature and the difficulty that arises in collecting them. 
In the early 1990s, Chinese farmers "suffered a surfeit of official taxes, levies, fines and 
service charges while experiencing a fall in incomes. With the aim to reduce the peasant 
burdens under repeated demands from the top leadership, some areas have halted the 
collection ofwelfare levies,"25 to the consternation of the poor and those cadres in the 
much neglected Ministry of Civil Affairs, whose charge it was to assist them. When 
collection is attempted, peasant resistance to levies is not uncommon, evidence of a 
weakening sense of social obligation. From these shortcomings, it is clear that levies 
should be replaced by more permanent arrangements. A more reasonable method of 
generating revenue would be to create a sound system of taxation; one that would be 
acceptable to the peasants because they would see some returns and that could be 
designated based on income, so that poor peasants in rich provinces do not bear an 
unreasonable burden.Z6 If there were clear benefits, people would be more likely to 
accept a social security tax. 
Conclusion 
China's attraction to personal accounts in the past seems to come from the same 
authority that has influenced its plans for a social security program: the United States. It 
25 Wong, 76. 
26 Leung. 
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is hard to say why China has been so eager to follow plans favored by the US, even when 
they do not seem to be the best plans for China, a very different nation. Perhaps it was 
because the US was seen as a model of capitalism and wealth when China first began its 
reforms. Although China claims not to be capitalist, but rather "socialist with Chinese 
characteristics," the United States was exactly where China wanted to be in the early 
1980s. Advisors to the central government could point to seemingly effective, ready-
made plans for it to adopt. The plans not only came from a successful state, but were also 
convenient, requiring little extra work for a government with other challenges to tackle. 
Unfortunately, most of these policies, especially health care, were not even sustainable 
for the United States. Approximately fifteen percent of Americans have no health 
insurance, and the Social Security system will someday bottom out. If these policies 
were not effective in the country for which they were designed, it is not reasonable to 
assume they would work for China. Regardless of why it previously chose the path it 
did, China needs to reevaluate its choices in order to find a solution more compatible with 
its large population and economic disparity. 
Previous chapters have enumerated so many complications in China's welfare 
system that it would be difficult to put forward one blanket solution that could fix all of 
China's problems. On the contrary, most possible solutions give rise to more questions 
than they answer. How much will these programs cost? Who will be responsible for 
making sure they run smoothly? The one fact that remains constant is that the money is 
there for the government to use; it has simply been unable to do so effectively for many 
years. Reform is a slow process, but one that the Communist Party can carry out if it is 
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committed to creating a healthy, satisfactory environment for its people. None of the 
presented solutions are impossible, so the Chinese government is faced with the 
challenge of deciding what is most important for its nation and which action to take first. 
In the next chapter, some themes common to all of these solutions will be 
discussed, illuminating the goals that should be at the heart of China's welfare policy in 
the years to come. If the Chinese government can remain focused on goals beyond that 
of maintaining the Communist power base, perhaps the lives of the people can truly be 
improved. 
CHAPTER6 
DISCUSSION 
In nearly all of the solutions to China's welfare problem offered by the experts, 
two themes emerge. One- programs should be mandatory, or enterprises and individuals 
will not participate. Two- the central government must take control and commit itself to 
creating effective social programs. From the data presented in this paper, it is clear that 
without taking these two courses of action, nothing will be done in the large bureaucracy 
that makes up the Communist Party. 
Government control is necessary in a one-party system to enforce the decisions 
coming down from higher levels. In the Communist Party, lower-level cadres essentially 
have a life-long tenure, and there is no reason for them to work in the best interest of the 
locals as long as they are subtle enough to get away with their graft and embezzlement 
schemes. More central supervision can help put a stop to this behavior, provided the state 
is willing to get rid of those cadres who cannot behave lawfully. Central control also 
makes it easier to coordinate policies, and gives more power to ministries that are 
currently fragmented and need assistance from the highest offices. 
Regarding making participation in programs mandatory, it can be said that in 
today's China, there is no incentive to help those who cannot improve their own lives. 
Because the Chinese economy is transforming, the main concern of businessmen and 
cadres is personal success and the accumulation of profit for their various enterprises. 
Philanthropy is a characteristic of societies that have long been stable and successful; 
Rl 
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China, on the other hand, needs a few rules to help it along. More practically, by 
requiring payments where they were once optional, but at the same time reducing the 
percentage asked for by the government, the state will collect more than it did when the 
percentage was much higher. No enterprise would voluntarily pay out 35 percent of its 
payroll, and the government is getting almost nothing in this optional system. Six to ten 
percent is a number that even the SOEs in China can afford to pay. 
If these two conditions are not met, the quality of life of the people will remain 
poor. People cannot produce if they are not healthy, and the consequences of an 
unproductive workforce could be detrimental to a growing world power like China. 
China needs its people, needs the large work force and large market to attract foreign 
direct investment. It cannot afford to throw them away. 
Many have said that with China's entry into the WTO, most of China's quality of 
life issues will be automatically resolved. Perhaps this is true in the long run. However, 
a more immediate consequence of foreign interest in investment will be the maintenance 
of low labor costs and social security investments. If these were to increase, it would be 
considered a deterrent to foreign direct investment.1 Therefore, until the system balances 
out, allowing for a population which demands a higher standard of living, other solutions 
will have to be examined and adopted. The question remaining is, if the government of 
China knows that these are the things that must be changed, why has it had so little 
success in creating a welfare system thus far? 
1 Leung. 
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What is Hindering the Process? 
Several reasons for the absence of a social welfare system have already been 
presented, but most of them offer visible hurdles that will have to be overcome in the 
process of developing such a system. Corruption is an obvious problem; if those 
concerned with the maintaining the function of a welfare system cannot keep cadres from 
skimming various funds, they certainly will not be successful. Infrastructure problems 
are also significant. The facilities and networks required to maintain the social programs 
for a country as populous and as large geographically as China will take time to 
construct. A better question than "why doesn't China have this infrastructure yet?" might 
be "why did China take so long to start developing it?'' 
Incentive 
There might be many reasons, but perhaps the most convincing given China's 
history is that it has had no incentive to do so. For China, the importance of the people 
tends to directly correlate with their proximity to areas of political importance and 
wealth. The people of Beijing and Shanghai have fairly well developed health care and 
pension programs. It comes as no surprise that the most wealthy entrepreneurs and 
higher-level cadres have proper care. The cities in which they live are more important, 
and by extension, the people who live there are more essential to the Chinese 
government. These are the people who make money for China and earn honor. If they 
do not receive proper treatment, it threatens the stability of the nation. In 1989, as the 
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world watched events in Beijing unfold, few paid any attention to simultaneous protests 
in other cities. 
Peasants, although numerous, are spread throughout China and lack political 
sway. The poor are unlikely to rise up against oppression or to protest the lack of proper 
care on any large scale. In the eyes of the Communist Party, they are therefore less of a 
liability, and if no one is paying attention, there is no need to try terribly hard to fix the 
rural problems. The Party has begun to recognize the problem in rural areas, partly due 
to pressures from the WTO and non-governmental organizations that have noticed the 
poor. This is the primary reason for the growing attention to reform. There is even some 
level of pressure from the inside, although it is difficult to measure the true impact of 
public pressure in a society in which citizens cannot vote and the poor could never 
mobilize effectively. 
Public Pressure 
Obviously, in countries controlled by authoritarian regimes, the ruling party 
cannot be voted out of power, and therefore the populace can have little direct effect on 
the way that party governs. It is difficult to gauge public opinion; however, the Chinese 
Communist Party remains acutely aware of public sentiment, knowing all too well what 
can go wrong when the people become dissatisfied. In order to prevent a mass uprising, 
the government has practiced a policy of appeasing people within reason, giving enough 
rights to divide the public on the issue of whether or not reforms have been timely and 
sufficient. 
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Although they often approach it resignedly, the poor Chinese are certainly not 
happy with their lot. At the end of 1997, the number of laid-off workers in China had 
reached 11.51 million. 2 The government owed these people more than 20 billion yuan in 
unemployment money, but could not pay. At that time, there was a common saying 
among the rural people: "You gave your entire life to the service ofthe Party, but when 
you got old, no one was there to take care of you. You thought of asking for help from 
your children, but then your children got laid off and lost their jobs. Yeah, that's the way 
life goes."3 Although ending on a passive note, it carried a certain dissatisfied edge, and 
the sentiment behind it is not acceptance, but anger. 
The people are concerned about developing a system of insurance for the retired 
and elderly; they are concerned about the nation's unemployment problem. 
Overwhelmingly, though, they are concerned about the lack of a public health system and 
the issue of reforming medical care for all citizens.4 The poor cannot help but notice 
that health problems are holding them back from making a decent living. They can have 
no upward mobility when they cannot even work. Compared to urban dwellers, "in 
China, the rural poor have noticeably worse health. But they are often seen as less 
important politically and economically"5 than their urban counterparts. If this regional 
discrimination continues, the Chinese government is in danger of facing a discontented 
populace, one that has nothing to lose because everything has been taken away. 
2 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
3 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
4 The Urban Sector Investigation Team of the State Statistical Bureau Survey, December 2000. 
(87% of respondents chose health care and public health reform as a category in which they were 
most interested and concerned.) 
5 Roberts, 94. 
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Final Thoughts 
As long as the stories coming from Chinese people remain the same: a man's 
mother paying his child's medical fees because he is unemployed; families forced to sell 
their homes to pay for organ transplants, even when the patient has almost no chance of 
survival;6 beggars living on the subway stairs, it can be said that the government is not 
doing enough. While China's goal remains becoming one of the premier powers in the 
world, its people are left behind. No national government can claim to have solved the 
problems of its entire population, but eventually, the government will have to deal with 
the fact that if over half of your people are starving, poor or ill, your nation cannot be 
truly great. As Zhang Zuoji said in his analysis of the construction of a social security 
system: 
Only when and if we have established and strengthened a 
social security system can we have created a flexible and 
lenient social environment for dealing with the fact that 
some enterprises will gain ground while other fail and lose 
and with the fluctuations in the size of our nation's work 
force.7 
So far, the government has been unable to accept this, attempting to support as 
many formerly state-owned enterprises as possible and allow them concessions at the 
expense of the workers. It has avoided thinking about how it will provide for its growing 
retired population, because it is truly a difficult problem to solve. If the Communist Party 
cannot find solutions to these issues itself, it must look into the possibility of private 
6 Liu Yan. 
7 Zhang Zuoji, 2001. 
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investors, who would be more than willing to make money off of providing the Chinese 
with services, or at least move to solve the Party's corruption problem, which is crippling 
many of the government's bureaucratic offices. In the Party's constant struggle to 
maintain its hold on the nation and legitimacy in the world, the people of China should 
under no circumstances be left behind. 
APPENDIX A 
Breakdown of Financial Allocations in Social Security White Paper 
Sector Allocation by Chinese Government 
Social Welfare for Children 600 million yuan 
Social Welfare for Disabled People 1.5 billion yuan + additional 100 million 
yuan raised 
Preferential Treatment - Servicemen and 8.79 billion yuan 
Families of Martyrs 
Old-Age Insurance 
- Basic old-age insurance funds - 54.4 billion yuan (47.4 billion from 
National social security fund central government) - 130 billion yuan -
lJnemploymentinsurance No funds allocated, left to local 
- lJnemployment allowance governments to determine the conditions. 
- Medical subsidies while receiving - Those laid off from SOEs will be 
benefits provided for by the state ("three 
- Re-employment services & training guarantees") 
lJrban Medical Insurance 
-
Social pool plus personal accounts - To be paid by the employer and 
Efforts to standardize services workers - Local governments, encourage -
- Work-related injury prevention, enterprise participation 
compensation and recovery - Businesses must pay premiums 
Maternity Insurance Paid by (willing) employers 
Social Welfare 
- Elderly - 13.49 billion yuan 
- Children 
-
600 million yuan 
- Disabled - 1.6 billion yuan 
Special Care and Placement 8.7 billion yuan 
- Funding and care for disabled 
veterans and families of martyrs 
-
The resettlement of ex-servicemen 
Social Relief 
-
lJrban Minimum Standard of Living - 15.6 billion yuan (includes 9.2 billion 
(permanent residents only) of central government subsidies to 
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disadvantaged regions) 
-
Natural Disaster Relief - 5.31 billion yuan (4.05 billion yuan 
from central government) 
- Also includes Social Mutual Help 
and Relief for Urban Vagrants and 
Beggars (neither are state-funded) 
Housing Security 
- Publicly Accumulated Funds 
- Low-rent Housing System - Funds are "pooled from other channels." 
Rural Areas 
-
Experimental Old-Age Insurance - State does not contribute, but awards 
families with only one child 600 yuan 
per person per year 
-
Cooperative Medical Service - 1.5 billion yuan in subsidies from 
local and central governments 
- Rural Social Relief - "Five guarantees" funding 
Source: Adapted from China's Social Security and Its Policy- A Government White Paper, 7 
September 2004. 
Note: In this document, the government allocates a total of billion yuan to various social 
programs, but what should be most notable is how many programs are unsupervised or 
optional, receiving little state support through funding or organization. 
APPENDIXB 
The Organization of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
A. The Responsibilities of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
Through the construction of the grassroots political organ, the village committees, and the 
residents' committee, the Ministry promotes economic development of cities and 
counties, encourages the institutionalisation of grassroots democracy. Through the 
management of social administrative affairs, the Ministry readjusts human relationships, 
resolves social contradictions, promotes the institutionalisation of social administration 
and management. Through the development of social security enterprises, the Ministry 
promotes the society orientation of public welfare; Through the preferential treatment to 
disabled ex-servicemen and to families of martyrs and of servicemen, the Ministry 
strengthens the unity of the army, and promotes the modernisation of the national 
defense. In the context of the new situation, the Ministry develops the mechanism of 
social stability function, and readjusts human relationships, resolves social contradictions, 
promotes stability and unity, and provides a healthy environment for the development of 
a modernised socialist construction. The principal duties include: 
1. According to the plans of national economy and social development, the 
Ministry studies and formulates long-term and mid-term strategies for the 
development of civil affairs work and organisational structure. The 
Ministry also works out annual plans with a mechanism of supervision and 
monitoring. 
2. The Ministry studies the working direction, laws, and regulations of: 
grassroots political organ, village committee, residents' committee, 
preferential treatment to and resettlement of ex-servicemen, relief to 
victims of natural disasters and the poverty-stricken people, social welfare, 
division of administrative regions, society and marriage registration, 
funeral service, reallocation of migrants. The Ministry is responsible for 
the monitoring and supervision of their implementation 
3. The Ministry is responsible for providing guidance to those self-managed 
mass organisations in the daily work of the construction of the grassroots 
political organ. 
4. The Ministry studies and decides the methods of giving preferential 
treatment to ex-servicemen and families of martyrs. 
5. The Ministry is responsible for the resettlement of the ex-servicemen. 
6. The Ministry is responsible for the relief of natural disaster, encourage 
self-salvation through production, monitors the use of relief material, and 
develops village cooperative insurance and assistance to the poverty-
stricken people. 
7. The Ministry is in charge of the relief work of poverty-stricken households 
and their regular assistance. 
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8. The Ministry studies and formulates plan to guide the development and 
management of community service and social welfare enterprises. 
9. The Ministry studies and formulates laws and policies governing the 
employment of handicapped people and development of welfare 
production. 
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10. The Ministry is responsible for the administrative division and naming of 
provinces, cities, xians and districts. 
11. The Ministry is responsible for mediating disputes concerning disputes in 
administrative territories. 
12. The Ministry is responsible for the registration of societies. 
13. The Ministry is responsible for the implementation of Marriage Law 
through marriage registration, management and reforms of marriage 
practices. 
14. The Ministry is responsible for the management and reform of the funeral 
service. 
15. The Ministry is responsible for the relocation of migrants and beggars. 
16. The Ministry is responsible for the management of the finances of civil 
affairs work, and monitoring the utilization and management of these 
finances. 
17. The Ministry advises the work of the Federation of Disabled People. 
B. The Organisational Structure of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
Ministry of Civil Affairs 
- Administration 
- Grassroots Political Organ Construction Department 
-Services for Ex-servicemen Department 
- Placement Department 
- Relief Department 
- Social Welfare Department 
- Administrative Region Demarcation and Naming Department 
- Society Registration Department 
- Social Affairs Department 
- Marriage Registration Department 
- Policy and Law Department 
- Personnel and Education Department 
- Coordination and Planning Department 
-International Cooperation Department 
Source: Joe C.B. Leung and Richard C. Nann, Authority and Benevolence: Social Welfare in 
China (Hong Kong: The Chinese UP, 1995), 171-3. 
Note: Text of this document is copied as it appeared in Leung and Nann. 
APPENDIXC 
Regional Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation, 1996 
Following the party central poverty alleviation work conference in 1996, the State 
Council "announced a plan to compel rich areas to help poor places. Dubbed 'Jupin 
xiezuo' (partnership in poverty alleviation), a rich province/area is matched with a poor 
region, with the requirement that the former give all the help it can to combat poverty in 
the latter."1 
To help 
Beijing -------------------1• Neimenggu 
Tianjin _________________ __. Gansu 
Shanghai-----------------------------~ Yunnan 
Guangdong----------------. Guangxi 
Jiangsu ------------------+ Shaanxi 
Zh~iang -----------------------------~ Sichuan 
Shandong------------------------------~ Xinjiang 
Liaoning ----------------~ Qinghai 
Fujian Ningxia 
Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen and Ningbo .. Guizhou 
Source: Linda Wong, Marginalization and Social Welfare in China, 1998, originally adapted from 
information in Ming Pao, 14 October 1996. 
1 Wong, 106. 
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